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I INTRODUCTION 
The International Labour Office (!LO) notes that women's worldwide economic activity 
rates have increased from 54 per cent in 1950 to 66 per cent in 1990 and in developed regions 
they are expected to exceed 80 per cent by the year 20 I 0. By I 990 the pattern of women's 
economic activity rate had also changed. The number of women spending their childbearing 
years in paid employment is escalating. 1 These trends are also evident in New Zealand. 
Between 1986 and 1996 the Jabour force participation of women whose youngest child was 
less than one year old increased by 7.9%, the increase for women with children aged between 
one and four years was I 0.6%. 2 This trend highlights the need for adequate parental leave.
3 
Not only is maternity leave and appropriate medical care essential to enable a 
woman to retain or regain her health and to return to work, but income replacement 
during her leave period has become indispensable for the well-being of herself, her child 
and her family. 
The notion of the 'male breadwinner' has become a myth of the past. Nowadays an 
increasing number of households throughout the world depend on two income earners in 
order to maintain a suitable standard of living. In many cases women's earned income is vital 
for the survival of the family. 4 The I LO acknowledges maternity as a social function entitling 
women workers to special protection as a condition for non-discrimination in employment,
5 
and presents the following challenge for member states: 6 
... to ensure that in the 21 st century maternity protection achieves the double goal 
of safeguarding health and ensuring employment rights in order to enable men and 
women to work together on the basis of equality. 
Paid parental leave is widely regarded as an important means of advancing the double 
goal of safeguarding health and ensuring employment rights. There has been mounting 
pressure for New Zealand to adopt some form of paid parental leave for some time. 
6 
International Labour Office (!LO) Maternity Protection at IVork: Re1·ision of the Matemitr Protection 
Co111·e111io11 (Revised) 1952 (No I 03) and Recommendation 1952 (No 95) ILO Conference 87th Session 
(!LO, Geneva, 1999) 5. 
Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Women's Affairs Ne11· Zealand N01r: Women (Government 
Publisher, Wellington, 1998) 86. 
I LO, above n 1, 10. 
!LO, above n I, 9. 
!LO, above n I, 16. 
!LO, above n I, 16. 
2 
In February 1998 the !LO issued a repo11 which showed that New Zealand is one of 
only six developed countries in the world which does not provide paid parental leave. 
7 
women's magazines took the issue on board and a proliferation of parental leave articles 
resulted, informing women of the issues and garnering their suppo11. There has been an 
intensely strong lobby by the 12 Weeks Campaign - a private interest group with diverse 
members. This campaign group has lobbied for 12 weeks' paid parental leave on the basis of 
its considerable benefits to children, women and families, and society in general. 
One of the few other developed countries which does not provide paid parental leave is 
the United States. In this context Nancy Folbre claims that citizens of the United States are 
currently underinvesting in human capital as well as "flouting [their] collective moral 
obligation for children's welfare".
8 This paper makes the same argument in respect of 
citizens of New Zealand. 
Section 11 of this paper outlines the current New Zealand situation with regard to paid 
parental leave, in particular the legislative and employment contract provisions will be 
detailed. Section Ill briefly considers how New Zealand's paid parental leave provisions 
measure up internationally. In Section IV the technical details of the Paid Parental Leave Bill 
will be outlined followed by a description of the political progress of the Bill. Section V uses 
neoclassical economic theory to make a case for the legislative provision of paid parental 
leave. Specifically, it is argued that the care of children can be regarded as a public good with 
positive externalities for society arising from secure attachments between parents and infants, 
increased breastfeeding and reduced daycare. In addition the care of children has negative 
externalities in the form of women's disadvantageous labour market position. Section VI 
describes how the National Government and business/employer groups used neoclassical 
economic theory to oppose the Bill and portray it as economically inefficient and too costly to 
implement, and shows why their arguments are wrong. Further it is argued that economic 
theory, ostensibly used in the public interest, was actually used to disguise the pursuit of self-
interest in both cases. Section V 11 explores the explanatory power of public choice theory in 
the context of the Bill. The essential question posed is whether public choice theory can 
7 Laila l larre, industrial relations spokesperson, Alliance (news release 2.3.98, Wellington). 
8 Nancy Folbre "Children as Public Goods" ( 1994) 84 American Economic Review 86, 89. 
3 
account for the failure of the Bill to progress beyond the select committee stage. This entails 
consideration of the relative weights of interest group influence, the government's re-election 
motive, and the government's ideology or desire to make good public policy, in determining 
the fate of the Bill. 
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11 PARENTAL LEA VE IN NEW ZEALAND: THE CURRENT SITUATION 
A Historicul Context 
According to the Ministry of Women's Affairs,9 there have been four critical stages in 
the development of parental leave in New Zealand. 
I. The initial introduction of parental leave in 1948 was limited to married women 
working in the public sector. 10 It was aimed primarily at encouraging teachers in 
native schools to continue working. A cutting from The Evening Post 
( I November I 947) described it in the following way. "Many of these schools are 
staffed by both husband and wife and if the wife continues teaching after the birth 
of a child, it will be an important factor in helping solve accommodation 
difficulties." 11 
2. In I 978 maternity leave was extended to 12 months and an ex-gratia payment on 
return to work was introduced as paii of a package which aimed to "eliminate 
discrimination against women and to promote equal opportunity for men and 
women in the state services". 12 
3. The introduction of the Maternity Leave and Employment Protection Act I 980 
brought legislated access to parental leave to private sector employees. From 
I 98 I all women who met the employment criteria were entitled to six months' 
.d . I 13 unpa1 matermty eave. 
4. Concerns expressed by the National Advisory Council on the Employment of 
Women (NACEW) about the need for parental rather than solely maternity leave 
provisions informed the debate which resulted in the current legislation. The 
Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act I 987 "provides for equal 
Ministry or Women's Affairs Parental lem·e Policies, IV0111e11 and the labour Market Nga Kaupapa Here 
Wa Whakata 1110 nga Matua, nga IVahine 111e te Ao Tuku Mahi A Co111parati, ·e Anazrsis of Neil' Zealand, 
S1l'eden, United Kingdo111, United States, Australia (Wellington 1995) 22. 
10 Public Service Regulations 14( 14) 1948 cited in Ministry of Women's Affairs Parental lem·e Policies above 
n 9. 
11 Adrienne O'Sullivan Matemity lecl\'e in the Ne11· Zealand Public Sen·ice (Policy Development Unit, SSC, 
Wellington, 1985) cited in Ministry or Women's Affairs Parental leare Policies above n 7, 9. 
12 O'Sullivan, above n I I. 
13 To be eligible for maternity leave required employment of at least 15 hours per week with the same employer 
for 18 months immediately preceding the birth or adoption. 
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opportunities for both parents to take leave from their employment to care for an 
·.c. · · fi ,,14 1111ant1111ts irstyear. 
New Zealand's parental leave provisions were initially designed to maintain women's 
participation in paid work. Over time an interest in promoting gender equality in the labour 
market has developed and the most recent legislation indicates an interest in the issue of 
gender equality in childcare. 
B T!,e Parentltl Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 
The Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act repealed the Maternity Leave and 
Employment Act 1980, and extended the entitlement to parental leave to male employees, 
whether married or in de facto relationships. 
I Coverage mul eligibility 
Any woman ( or her spouse if he intends to assume care of the newborn child) who has 
worked for the same employer for at least I O hours per week for 12 months preceding the 
expected date of delivery is entitled to parental Jeave. 15 Thus employees in temporary or 
seasonal work, independent contractors and those working few and irregular or casual hours 
are unlikely to qualify for leave. Parents who adopt a child under five years are entitled to 
leave on the same basis as parents giving birth to a child. 16 
2 Duration 
Special leave of I O days is available during a woman's pregnancy. Maternity leave is 
available for a continuous period of not more than four weeks. 17 Paternity leave is available 
to spouses for a continuous period of not more than two weeks. 18 Extended leave is available 
14 Department of Labour Report of" the Working Part_1· on Pan11e11t for Parental Lem·e (Wellington, 1986) 2 
cited in O'Sullivan, above n 11, 23. 
15 Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, ss 7, 17, 23. 
16 Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, ss 8, 18, 24. 
17 Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, s 9. 
18 Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, s 19. 
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to either parent for a continuous period of not more than 52 weeks 19 less any maternity or 
paternity leave already taken. 
3 Payment 
There is no statutory prov1s1on for payment. Payment is a matter of negotiation 
between employers and employees. Consequently parental leave provisions may be found in 
individual or collective employment contracts. In addition, paid parental leave provisions 
feature in some company policies. 
4 Job protection 
Employees are protected from dismissal by reason of pregnancy or taking leave under 
the Act. Jobs must be held open for four weeks, then for any further period of leave except 
where it is proven to be a "key" position or where a redundancy occurs. 
5 Take-up rates 
Eighty-three per cent of parents in the employed labour force qualify for parental leave 
under the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987. In relation to take-up rates, 
66 per cent of eligible mothers had used the parental leave provisions under the Act compared 
to 43 per cent of eligible fathers. 
Birth figures for the year ended June 1997 amount to 57,310. Treasury estimates, based 
upon this number of births, are for 30,000 mothers seeking parental leave with around 20,000 
meeting qualifying criteria. 20 
C Employment Contract Provisions 
As there is no legislative provision for paid parental leave in New Zealand, payment to 
date has largely been a matter of negotiation between employers and employees. Other than 
anecdotal information, there is little research available about the content of individual or 
informal employment contracts. However, a parental leave survey conducted by the Industrial 
19 Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987, s 26. 
20 Industrial Relations Service Briel to the Social Sen-ices Select Committee on Paid Parental Lem•e Bill 
(Department of Labour, I 0.3 .98) 3. 
7 
Relations Service in I 994 found that 32 per cent of females and 73 per cent of males received 
some payment for parental leave. 21 
The Department of Labour's current figures on parental leave prov1s1ons within 
collective employment contracts show that 16 per cent of these contracts, which cover 
350,000 employees, make provision for some payment with respect to parental leave. 22 A 
Victoria University analysis of collective employment contracts covering 390, I 00 employees 
showed that 43 per cent of such contracts provided some payment associated with parental 
leave.23 The most common form of paid parental leave is an ex gratia payment equivalent to 
30 days' pay after completion of a fu11her six months' service upon return from leave or, 
I I d . . I 24 . . f 2'i w ,ere eave urat1on 1s s 1ort, a cont111uat1on o pay. · 
Entitlement to payment varies significantly across industries. Very few employees in 
the manufacturing, retail, accommodation or cafe sectors are eligible for payment. 
Conversely, many employees in the government communications, administration, health , 
education and finance sectors are entitled to payment. With the exception of the finance 
sector, it is predominantly the public sector which provides paid parental leave. A standard 
entitlement in the finance sector provides three days' paid leave to the father either side of the 
bi11h or adoption of a child. Eighty-one per cent of employees in core government services 
were contractually entitled to paid parental leave. Almost the same proportion of private 
sector employees (79 per cent) had no contractual entitlement to any payment associated with 
parental leave.26 The authors estimate that their survey sample represents approximately one-
?7 quarter of the New Zealand labour markei.-
21 Industrial Relations Service Brief to the Social Serrices Select Co111111iffee, above n 20. 
22 Industrial Relations Service Ad1'ice to the Social Serrices Select Co111111iffee (Department of Labour, I 0.3.99) 54. 
23 Raymond Harbridge and others E111plo_r111e11t Contracts: Bargaining Trends and £111ploy111e111 lmr Update 
1997/98 (Graduate School of Business and Government Management, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, 1998) 49. 
24 Less than 30 days. 
25 Harbridge, above n 23. 
26 Harbridge, above n 23. 
27 It is important to note that the surveys are done on a voluntary basis. Some employers and small unions have 
declined to supply their collective employment contracts for analysis. Consequently it is likely that those 
collective employment contracts which provide conditions exceeding the prescribed minimum such as paid 
parental leave, are over-represented in the sample. Furthermore the focus of this study is on collective 
bargaining; consequently individual employment contracts are not covered and may show quite different 
trends. 
8 
Table I: Paid parental leave by sector 
Payments available No payment Employees coYered 
(per cent) (per cent) (000s) 
A 11 contracts 43 57 390.1 
Private sector 21 79 217.6 
Government core services 81 19 141.1 
Government - trading 64 36 10.5 
Local government - core 2 98 13.5 
Local government - trading 2 98 7.3 
Anecdotal information suggests that the incidence of paid parental leave in the private 
sector is growing rapidly, particularly in highly skilled occupations. This position is 
suppo11ed by the EEO Trust which suggests that informal individual arrangements for paid 
leave may be common among women at senior levels in reasonably highly paid occupations. 
A number of private compa111es have recently introduced formal prov1s1ons for paid 
parental leave. Such companies include Westpac, BNZ, Bell Gully Buddle Weir, Price 
Waterhouse, Lion Nathan, Telecom, TVNZ, KPMG. These provisions most commonly 
include a return to work requirement and they are usually limited to senior employees and/or 
those with long service. Entitlement varies considerably from two days on full pay to six 
months at half pay.28 
Karen Feint, an employment Jaw specialist at Buddle Findlay, says "Employers are 
increasingly regarding paid maternity leave as cost-effective". Various studies estimate it can 
cost from $20,000 to $50,000 to replace experienced senior employees.29 Westpac estimates 
the cost of replacing a worker with I O years' experience at $3 7 ,OOO. The number of women 
resigning from Westpac in order to have children has halved since their introduction of paid 
maternity Jeave. 30 Accountancy firm Price Waterhouse offers 12 weeks' maternity leave on 
full pay or six months on half pay to staff with seven years' service and to managers with one 
year's service. Bell Gully Buddle Weir offers maternity leave for senior associates on full 
pay for three months. 3 1 
28 Industrial Relations Service, above n 20, 54. 
29 " Paid Maternity Leave: The Boss 's Burden?" The Independent, Auckland, New Zealand, 18 March 1998, 20. 
30 Above n 19, 20. 
3 1 Above n 29, 20. 
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These trends suggest that the market will increasingly provide paid parental leave to 
women, or men , with bargaining power, that is, individuals with specialist knowledge, skills 
and experience in highly-paid occupations. The situation with regard to Jess skilled 
individuals in poorly paid occupations is very different. The market will not voluntarily 
provide paid parental leave for these workers, government intervention will be required to 
force its hand. As Karen Feint observes it is clear that companies are only going to provide 
paid parental leave if it benefits their bottom line. 32 The bottom line is the company ' s profit 
margin. However profit margins are, by their very nature, only short-term measures. Many 
of the benefits to employers of paid parental leave can only be seen in the long term. Thus, as 
Karen Feint points out "[i]f you want [paid parental leave] across the board for social policy 
reasons, then it needs to be legislated".33 
D Other Assistance for Families 
Although there is no legislative provision for paid parental leave in New Zealand, there 
are a number of state-provided measures which may ease the financial burden of having 
children, particularly for low-income families. These include free antenatal and under six 
health care services, Plunket assistance, income suppot1 in the form of Unemployment 
Benefit, Domestic Purposes and Widows Benefits and other family assistance such as Family 
Support and Guaranteed Minimum Family lncome. 34 
E Parental Tax Cre,lit 
The Parental Tax Credit policy introduced by the government in the I 999 Budget gives 
some "recognition to the additional financial pressures facing many families with newborn 
babies". 35 The Parental Tax Credit is a means-tested entitlement which will be available in 
respect of children born after I October 1999. The maximum entitlement will be up to$ I ,200 
for each newborn child. The credit will be paid to the primary caregiver at a rate up to a 
maximum of $150 per week per child for up to eight weeks after the bi11h of a child. The 
Parental Tax Credit will be subject to the same abatement rules that apply to Family Support. 
32 Above n 29, 20. 
33 Above n 29, 20. 
34 See Appendix I for details. 
35 Social Services Select Committee Report 011 the Paid Parental Lea1·e Bill (25.6.99) 16. 
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Ill INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
An International Labour Organisation (ILO) repo1t published in February 1998 reported 
that most of the countries surveyed in 1997 claimed to provide some payment for maternity 
leave ( 138 out of 145 countries surveyed). In 43 of these countries paid leave is fully funded 
by the employer and 71 countries provide leave funded by social security. Only 31 countries 
provide less than the two-thirds wage replacement recommended by the IL0.36 Eighty-eight 
of the 145 countries surveyed reported that they provide I 00 per cent wage replacement for a 
defined period of maternity leave and 119 countries meet the !LO standard of 12 weeks, with 
62 of those countries providing for 14 weeks or more. Coverage of female employees varies 
between countries.37 
Many of these countries have very different social, economic and political arrangements 
to New Zealand, therefore meaningful international comparisons are somewhat difficult to 
make. Having said that, despite the other assistance provided for young families in New 
Zealand,38 it would appear that New Zealand does not measure up well internationally. 
Positive elements of current New Zealand parental leave policy include the job protection 
component and the availability of gender neutral parental leave for up to 52 weeks; however 
the absence of any wage replacement component is disappointing. The Parental Tax Credit 
policy introduced in the 1999 Budget does not equate to a wage replacement leave policy; its 
ability to enable women, who otherwise could not afford leave, to take leave is highly 
questionable. 
36 ILO World ~l Work ( 1998) 24, 18-19. 
37 Social security n1ay cover a sn1all percentage of the econon1ically active population in so1ne countries, for 
example, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon. In some countries certain sectors of the economy, for 
example, agricultural or informal sectors arc excluded from maternity leave coverage. 
38 Such as free antenatal care and free doctors ' visits for under six-year-olds - see Appendix I. 
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IV THE PAID PARENTAL LEAVE BILL 
A Technirnl Det"ils 
The Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 (hereafter referred to as 
PLEP Act 1987) provides 14 weeks' unpaid maternity leave, two weeks' unpaid paternity 
leave, 10 days' special leave during pregnancy and up to 52 weeks' unpaid extended leave on 
the birth or adoption of a child. The eligibility criteria for parental leave can be found in 
section 7 of the PLEP Act 1987 which provides that: 
"every female employee -
(a) who becomes pregnant; and 
(b) who, at the expected date of delivery, will have been for the immediately 
preceding 12 months in the employment of the same employer for at least 
I O hours in each week, -
- shall be entitled to maternity leave in accordance with this Act. 
Section 8 provides the equivalent criteria in respect of an adoptive mother. The 
eligibility criteria for parental leave remains unchanged by the Paid Parental Leave Bill. 39 
The Bill amends the current legislation by providing that the first 12 weeks of maternity leave 
are paid. The right to paid leave can be transferred by a female employee to her spouse in full 
or in part if he intends to assume care of the child.40 The two weeks' paternity leave available 
to a male employee will be paid where his spouse is not entitled to paid leave, that is, where 
the spouse does not work or works less than I O hours per week. 41 
The Bill provides for an employee to be paid at 80 per cent of his or her earnings out of 
a central fund with a proviso that no employee is to be paid more than the average male 
weekly wage.-12 It also provides for the establishment of a central fund, called the Parental 
Leave Fund, which will consist of premium payments collected from all employers at a 
39 I lereafter referred to as the Bill. Te Puni Kokiri have estimated that based on the respective employment 
rates of Maori and all women, only 30 per cent of Maori women aged I 5--l4 years may be eligible for 
parental leave compared with approximately 40 per cent of all women in the same age group. A comparison 
of fertility rates shows a higher birth rate for Maori women (3.32 live births per I OOO compared with 1.97 for 
all women). Thus while Maori women are more likely to give birth, they are less likely to qualify for 
parental leave. Te Puni Kokiri Paid Pare111a/ leare Bill - Briefing Paper to the Social Sen•ices Se/eel 
Co111111ittee ( I 0.3.99) 3. 
40 Paid Parental Leave Bill, cl 2. 
41 Paid Parental Leave Bill, cl 3. 
42 Paid Parental Leave Bill, cl 5. 
12 
prescribed rate based on the employer's total payroll. Employers will be entitled to claim 
from this fund for paid maternity or paternity leave taken by an employee under the Act. 
The detailed administration of the Act will be governed by regulation, including the 
prescription of procedures for the rates and collection of premiums. 
B Political Progress 
The Paid Parental Leave Bill with which this paper deals is a rather unique happening in 
New Zealand politics. The Bill is a private member's bill. Laila Harre, the industrial 
relations spokesperson for the Alliance has, as she puts it, been honoured to carry "the 12 
Weeks Campaign mantle" into Parliament and heralded paid parental leave as an issue whose 
time has come. How the Bill got to Parliament can be described as pure luck. lt was picked 
out of a ballot and introduced to the House for its first reading. The Bill was subsequently 
referred for consideration by the Social Services Select Committee following its second reading 
in the House on 9 September 1998. 
The select committee received submissions on the Paid Parental Leave Bill until 
11 December 1998. In total 837 submissions were received; 719 of these were form 
submissions supporting the Bill. Of the 118 substantive submissions received by the 
committee, 84 submissions, mainly from individuals, community organisations, and 
employees organisations supported the Bill. Thirty-three submissions, mainly from employer 
organisations, individual employers and some community groups, opposed the Bill. 
The select committee repo11 was published on 25 June 1999 with their recommendation 
that the Bill should not proceed. National members (3) and Act ( 1) voted against the Paid 
Parental Leave Bill. Labour members (2) and Alliance voted for the Bill. The Mauri Pacific 
member abstained, acknowledging both the need for some form of paid parental leave and 
National's power of veto. 
The select committee's report was tabled in the House on 1 September 1999. Laila 
Harre (Alliance) moved that it be referred back to the select committee for further 
consideration in light of the Parental Tax Credit Policy introduced by the government in the 
1999 Budget. A majority of the House voted against referral back to the select committee. 
The vote was very close at 60 to 58. The Paid Parental Leave Bill was subsequently 
discharged. 
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V USING NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY TO MAKE A CASE FOR PAID 
PARENTAL LEAVE 
A Brief Overview of Neochtssical Economic Theo,y 
In neoclassical economic theory the perfectly competitive free market 111 which 
individuals actively pursue their own interests through the voluntary exchange of goods 
and/or services for value according to their preferences and their income is thought to achieve 
the optimal level of efficiency. In the jargon of economics this optimal level of efficiency is 
referred to as Pareto-efficiency, a situation in which, given the initial distribution of incomes 
and resources, it is not possible to reallocate income and resources between individuals so that 
one person is better off without making someone else worse off.43 This Pareto-efficient 
situation is an ideal state rather than a realistic goal; it essentially requires that income and 
resources are distributed without any loss or waste as a result of the distribution activity. 
In neoclassical economic theory the free market is regarded as the best guarantor of 
society's collective well-being. The key tenet of such theory is its behavioural postulate -
that individuals are self-interested, rational utility maximisers. As Joseph Stiglitz describes 
it:44 
... self-interest is a much more persistent characteristic of human nature than a 
concern to do good and therefore provides a more reliable basis for the organization of 
society. Moreover, individuals are more likely to ascertain with some accuracy what is in 
their own self-interest than they are to determine what is in the public interest. 
Thus, in neoclassical economic theory, there is a presumption in favour of free market 
provision of goods and services, including social services. However this presumption may be 
rebutted in the presence of market failure(s) - the traditional rationale for government 
intervention. Market failure refers to those situations in which the conditions such as perfect 
competition, co-operation and complete information, necessary to achieve Pareto efficiency 
do not exist or are impeded in some way. Market failures potentially present in the market for 
43 CV Brown and PM Jackson Public Sector Eco110111ics ( 4 ed, Basil Blackwell , Cambridge, 1990) 28. 
44 Joseph E Stiglitz Eco110111ics of the Public Sector (2 ed, WW orton & Co, New York , 1988) 62. 
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paid parental leave may thus constitute an efficiency argument, or arguments, for government 
to make legislative provision for paid parental leave. Indeed some economists are of the view 
that the occurrence of three or more market failures in tandem necessitates government 
provision in the interests of efficiency.45 Factors that bring about the failure of markets to 
achieve efficient outcomes include the existence of public goods and externalities.
46 
This 
section of the paper will make a case for paid parental leave based on the argument that the 
care of children amounts to a public good with positive and negative externalities. 
B Public Goo,ls 
I What is" public good? 
A pure public good is defined as a commodity with47 
certain characteristics such that its consumption by any one economic agent does 
not reduce the amount available for others. Thus, making the commodity available to any 
single individual makes it possible to provide it for everyone without additional cost. The 
benefits of a private good are consumed exclusively, whereas a public good may be 
consumed jointly or concurrently by many individuals, that is, public goods are 11011-
excludable and non-rival in consumption. 
Once consumers realise that they cannot be excluded from the use of the public good, 
there is no incentive for them to pay for it; they can take a 'free ride'.-18 
Since Pareto's analysis of allocative efficiency does not confer moral principles or 
social constraints upon consumers, they will have no sense of guilt when 'free-riding'. 
Indeed it would be inconsistent for them to pay for a public good since they are assumed 
to maximise their welfare. Avoiding payment allows them to increase consumption of 
other goods and so increase their welfare. 
Thus, if a public good 1s to be produced, payment must be made compulsory via 
taxation. 
45 Rebecca Blank When con Public Policy Makers Relr 011 Prirate Markets? The Ejfectii·e Proi·ision of Social 
Sec11ritr (NBER Working Paper 7099, 1999) 5-6. 
46 Brown and Jackson, above n 43, 29. 
47 Brown and Jackson, above n 43, 61. Non-excludable means it is not possible to prevent use of the service by 
those who do not pay for it (producers are therefore unable to recover costs). Non-rival in consumption 
means that one person's consumption of the commodity does not affect any other person's consumption of it. 
48 Stephen J Bailey Public Sector Econo111ics, Theo1:r, Polic:r ond Practice (MacMillan Press, London, 1995) 30-31. 
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2 The Cltre of children as ll public good 
Feminist economist Nancy Folbre argues that the care or nurturing of children is a 
public good and that markets alone will not adequately provide for it.
49 Folbre believes that 
nu11uring or care is undervalued. Parents are unable to recoup the costs of their nurturing 
labour thus, according to traditional economic analysis, in the absence of government 
intervention, well-nu11ured children will be underproduced. 
Folbre expresses the non-excludability aspect of nurturing as follows: "[p]eople do not 
rear children and then charge everybody who comes into contact with them for the benefits 
that results from their having been well brought up".50 
Regarding the care or nu11uring of children as a public good with both positive and 
negative externalities has a number of far-reaching economic and social implications. To date 
there has been relatively little research into, or indeed attention paid to, economic analyses of 
the contributions of non-market labour to the development of human and social capital. Such 
contributions, while not impossible to measure, are extremely difficult to measure. This is 
primarily due to the fact that the benefits of m111uring are so diffuse, and that the benefits of 
nurturing are not contracted for by the people who consume the services, that is, children. In 
addition, the benefits of nu11uring tend to be realised in the long term rather than the sho11 
term. Moreover, it is difficult to establish or rather isolate, distinct causal links between 
nurturing and any resultant benefits or disadvantages experienced by the child, let alone 
establish , or isolate, fu11her causal links between those benefits and disadvantages and the 
actual contributions made to human and/or social capital. In the context of paid parental leave 
it becomes an even more difficult task since we need to narrow our focus to the benefits 
arising from nurturing in the early months of a child's life only. 
(a) Human capital 
Non-cognitive development such as social and emotional development - the domain of 
nw1uring - is increasingly being regarded as a pre-requisite for cognitive development.
51 
49 Nancy Folbre 'The Neglect of Care-giving" ( 1998) 41 (5) Challenge 45, 45 . 
so Folbre "The Neglect of Care-giving", above n 49, 51 . 
51 Folbre "Children as Public Goods", above n 8. 
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Studies show that the resilience and later success of some socially disadvantaged children is 
the result of early child-centred parenting, of which parental leave is one vital component. 
52 
There is some evidence53 that paid parental leave can facilitate the development of these 
precursors to cognitive development, and indeed cognitive development itself, in the first few 
months of a child's life. Enabling working parents to spend time with their children in this early 
formative stage may be the most cost-effective way of providing children with the emotionally 
rich environment necessary for healthy social, emotional and cognitive development. This in 
turn will influence their levels of educational achievement, and then subsequently their labour 
market productivity and ability to contribute to society. 
The latest research on brain development54 has identified the critical window of 
opportunity, in terms of brain development, as being the first three years of life, particularly the 
first year, where the foundations are laid for future learning. The early experience of a 
stimulating environment which encourages exploration and language development may also 
influence nerve growth and boost a child's IQ. 55 Conversely, an understimulated child will lose 
this opportunity and may therefore never realise his or her full potential. Research has also 
shown that the active involvement of fathers with their children from an early age has a positive 
effect on achievement, particularly in cognitive development. 56 Thus, measures which increase 
the take-up rate of parental leave by fathers can be viewed as an investment in future human 
capital. One key element affecting fathers' take-up rates is wage replacement.57 
(b) Social capital 
There is a growing interest in the notion of investing in social capital. This grew out of 
the chaotic situation in the former Soviet Union. The social climate in those countries is 
52 A Osborne "Resilient Children: A Longitudinal Study of High Achieving Society Disadvantaged Children" 
( 1990) cited in Helen Wilkinson Ti111e 0111: The Costs a11d Benefits of Paid Parental Lea re (Demos, London, 
1997) 53. 
53 Primarily relating to the outcomes of parental care versus daycare in terms of child development outcomes. 
54 See Ti111e magazine article. 
55 J Brierley "The Growing Brain: Childhood's Crucial Years" ( 1976) cited in Helen Wilkinson Ti111e 0111: The 
Costs and Benefits ()/Paid Parental Leare (Demos, London, 1997) 53. 
56 M Lamb ( 1982) cited in I lelen Wilkinson Ti111e 0111: The Costs and Benefits ()lPaid Parental LeMe (Demos, 
London, 1997) 202. 
57 British surveys have also identified the workplace culture as an "invisible barrier" to leave-taking. Men often 
regard taking parental leave as career-inhibiting. Helen Wilkinson Ti111e Ow: The Costs and Benefits ()l Paid 
Parental Leare (Demos, London, 1997) 117. 
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impeding the establishment and functioning of markets, in particular massive organised crime 
and distrust of government. This has led economists to start paying attention to factors that 
can contribute to an environment of trust in which markets can function. Child-rearing and 
nurturing labour are important and under-analysed contributors to that social capital,58 
especially given that the initial, and critical, development of an individual's trust occurs in the 
early weeks or months of life when an infant is completely dependent on its primary 
caregiver. 
The "Cambridge Study" which studied 400 London males up to the age of 32 found that 
"early parental engagement was vital in helping to prevent later offending and other anti-
social activities in the future". 59 As David Farrington argues, millions of dollars are spent on 
the criminal justice system. Addressing the roots of crime would be more cost effective and 
"support for families in the difficult task of childrearing will be central to such a strategy". 60 
The experience of parental warmth, consistency and particularly interest, has been shown to 
produce healthy, productive and responsible adults. 61 
Public good arguments form the backbone for many of the family policies of European 
countries. To date such arguments have been unsuccessful in New Zealand, as they have 
been in the United States, pa1ticularly when legislation imposes clearly defined costs on the 
business community or other identifiable groups. 62 In analysing the evolution of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act 1993, Spalter-Roth and Hartmann contend that the "United States 
Chamber of Commerce and other business organizations were successful in discrediting the 
public goods argument and in changing the debate on family and medical leave from the 
benefits to the family and society as a whole"63 to "the costs to business". The coalition 
suppo1ting the legislation was unable to shift the argument back to concern for children and 
58 Folbre "Children as Public Goods", above n 8, 53. 
59 D Farrington "Teenage Anti-Social Behaviour" ( 1995) cited in Helen Wilkinson Ti111e 0111: The Costs and 
Bene_{,ts q/Paid Parental Leare (Demos, London, 1997) 51. 
611 Farrington, above n 59. 
61 G Pugh, E De'J\th and C Smith '·Confident Parents, Confident Children" cited in Helen Wilkinson Ti111e 0111: 
The Costs and Bene.fits of Paid Parental Leare (Demos, London, 1997) 52. 
62 Eileen Trzcinski 'The Use and Abuse of Neoclassical Theory in the Political Arena: The Example of Family 
and Medical Leave in the United States" in Edith Kuiper and Jolande Sap (eels) 0111 of the Margin: Fe111inisl 
Perspecth·es on Eco110111ics (Routledge, London, 1995) 243. 
63 The call for family and medical leave originally arose out of the research of child psychologists and child 
development experts. 
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the future of society. 64 (It is instructive to remember that the Family and Medical Leave Act 
passed in 1993 provides only for unpaid leave.) This paper argues that public goods 
arguments have similarly been successfully discredited in New Zealand. Section Vil outlines 
how this has been achieved. 
In the United States Donna Lenhoff, one of the leaders of the American coalition, 
lamented that the only data available to the supporters of the legislation was regarding parent-
child bonding. Surely, she suggested, there must be costs to women and their families of not 
having leave. 65 This argument is a negative externality argument. 
C Externalities 
1 What is ,111 externality? 
According to Dennis Mueller66 
an externality occurs when the consumption or production activity of one 
individual or firm has an unintended impact on the utility or production function of 
another individual or firm ... Given the existence of externalities, a non-Pareto optimal 
allocation of resources often results. 
What is crucial to the issue of Pareto efficiency is not that one individual consumes the 
same good as another but that his consumption alters another's utility in a manner not 
d fi I I I · 67 accounte or t 1roug 1 t 1e price system. There are positive externalities, which are 
essentially unintended benefits and negative externalities which are unintended costs "that are 
not included in the prices that rule in the market place. The price signals are therefore 
disto11ed and decisions made on the basis of these prices will not fully reflect the value of the 
resources used". 68 
64 Trzcinski, above n 62, 244. 
65 Donna Lenhoff. 
66 Dennis C Mueller Public Choice II (Cambridge University Press, USA, 1989) 25. 
67 Mueller, above n 66, 27. 
68 Brown and Jackson , above n 43, 40. 
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Government intervention offers the possibility of achieving Pareto optimality by 
effectively changing individuals' cost-benefit assessments to more adequately reflect the 
value of the resources used. 69 
2 Neg"tive extern"lities 
Jn the case of negative externalities government intervention attempts to correct the 
allocative inefficiency by discouraging the production or consumption of those goods and 
services that are over-produced or over-consumed. This is most commonly achieved by the 
imposition of a tax on the activity concerned, for example, pollution is a negative externality 
- it has unaccounted for, detrimental effects on the environment. If a pollution tax is imposed 
on businesses who pollute then, in principle, those businesses' cost functions will be modified 
so as to include the social costs to the environment, of such pollution. 70 
However, environmentalists may argue that it is not possible to assess the long-term 
impacts of pollution before they occur. Consequently there should be a presumption in favour 
of environmental protection. 71 Stephen Bailey suggests that this risk averse strategy may be 
too restrictive of economic activity but that it raises profound moral and philosophical issues 
which can only be addressed by public debate. 72 I would argue that, leaving aside the moral 
and philosophical issues, a risk averse strategy in relation to protection of the environment 
and, indeed, in relation to the protection of children and families, is likely to be an efficient 
strategy in the long term and only restrictive of economic activity in the immediate present. 
This appears to be a fundamental flaw in economic theory - its failure to account for and 
adequately value future costs and benefits. Certainly economic theory seems to lend itself to 
a sho11-term focus. Data of short-term costs and benefits can be more easily collected and 
therefore quantified. Long-term costs and benefits on the other hand require more extensive 
and more costly research. 
69 Conversely government intervention by its very nature may create allocative and distributional inefficiencies 
even worse than those it was designed to improve. Brown and Jackson, above n 43 , 54. 
70 Brown and Jackson, above n 43 , 40. 
7 1 Bailey, above n 48, 34. 
72 Bailey, above n 48, 34. 
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3 Positive externalities 
Market provision of goods or services will be too low relative to their value, where they 
have spill-over benefits for third parties not involved in the transactions. Such benefits are 
external to the market and therefore not incorporated into price structures. It would be 
irrational for individuals to take into account the wider social benefits of their activities since 
that would mean paying for more output than they individually require. 73 In the case of 
positive externalities government intervention attempts to correct the allocative inefficiency 
by encouraging the production of those goods and services that are currently under-produced 
or under-consumed relative to their value. For example, government may offer subsidised 
health care or education to increase consumption of those 'goods'. 
In fiscal terms well-nurtured children represent a positive externality. As Nancy Folbre 
argues: 74 
[a]ll individuals enjoy significant claims upon the earnings of future working age 
adults through social security and public debt. But not all individuals contribute equally 
to the care of these future adults. Individuals who make little or no contribution to child-
rearing are free-riding on parental labor. 
4 Externalities - application to paid parental leave 
This paper supports the argument that the care and nurturing of children is, at least 
partly, a public good with both positive and negative externalities. 1 he externalities arising 
from the parental , usually maternal , care and nurturing of children will be examined in 
relation to the two principal objectives of paid parental leave: first , improving the health and 
welfare of children and mothers ; second, addressing women's inequality in the labour market. 
The contributions paid parental leave can make in advancing each objective will be 
considered. 
The European Commission ( 1994) notes that there have been no detailed and 
comprehensive cost-benefit studies of paid parental leave undertaken and there is little 
1.1 Bailey, above n 48, 34. 
74 Folbre "Children as Public Goods", above n 8, 86. 
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quantified work detailing to what extent leave arrangements contribute to specific 
objectives. 75 This represents a potentially fruitful area for future research. 
D Improving the Health am/ We(fare of Children and Mothers 
The benefits of parental leave to children are complex, involving physiological, 
psychological and developmental aspects. Three key issues in this regard are attachment, 
breastfeeding and physical health outcomes in daycare. 
1 Aw,chment 
During the first year of life, the infant will accomplish more than physical growth 
and motor development. He or she will also learn basic patterns of human social 
communication and begin to develop a sense of self-wo11h and efficacy, the capacity to 
love other people and a belief that the world is an understandable and enjoyable place. 
This process begins at birth when the consistent and appropriate responsiveness of an 
adult to an infant's signal builds in the infant the beginnings of trust and delight in the 
world. 76 
Several studies link caregiver, usually maternal, responsiveness to infant cues and a 
predictable routine to the development of a secure attachment relationship between an infant 
and its parent(s). 77 In turn this attachment is linked to cognitive development and further 
linked in several studies78 to the possession of culturally valued qualities such as "a tendency 
towards exploration, autonomy and sociability". 79 In addition, child psychologists claim that 
good quality early bonding better equips individuals to deal with difficulties and loss in 
75 P Callister and VN Podmore Striking a Balance: Fa111i/ies, IVork and Ear~r Childhood Education (NZ 
Council for Educational Research, Palmerston North, 1995) 60. 
76 Robin Harwood "Parental Stress and the Young Infant's Needs'' in Edward F Zigler and Meryl Frank (eds) 
The Parental leare Crisis: Tml'{frd a National Polic1· (Yale University Press, New York, 1988) 55, 55. 
77 During the first six months of life, a period which constitutes the preattachmcnt and attachment formation 
phases, predictable routine and responsive sensitive caretaking may be even more important than care-giver 
continuity in developing secure attachment relationships (that is, extreme unpredictability in the first few 
months of life may be more upsetting to the infant than moderate amounts of separation (Kagan ( 1983) cited 
in Harwood, above n 76, 58). In fact, there is some evidence that moderate amounts of separation involving 
regular contact with non-parental caregivers do not necessarily interfere with the development of a secure 
attachment relationship when high quality care arrangements are used (Brookhart and Hock ( 1976), Jacobson 
and Wi I le ( 1984 ), Ragozin ( 1980), Schwartz ( 1983) cited in Harwood, above n 76, 58) although studies have 
found relationships between out-of-home care and insecure parent-infant attachments among lower income 
families using care arrangements of varying quality. 
78 Arend, Gove and Sroufe (1979), Conderville and Main (1981), Matas, Arend and Sroufe (1978), Pastor 
( 1981 ), Waters, Wippman and Sroufe ( 1979) cited in Harwood, above n 76, 58. 
79 Kagan ( 1983) cited in I larwood, above n 76, 58. 
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adulthood.so Attachment status also correlates with depression, relationship disharmony, 
divorce, attitudes to authority figures and achievement and motivation at work.s 1 
The available literature suggests a relationship between high levels of perceived 
parental, particularly maternal, stress and/or dissatisfaction and decreased sensitivity to infant 
cuess2 which in turn negatively affects the development of a secure attachment relationship. 
Financial stress, as a result of forgone income, has been linked to poor child development 
outcomes.s3 There are three groups of families that may be especially vulnerable to stress 
during the early months of an infant's life: single parent families, low income families, and 
families in which the mother is experiencing postnatal depression. 84 Hock ( I 980) suggests 
that the mother's satisfaction with her work or non-work situation affects the quality of the 
mother-infant relationship more so than her work status itself.s5 
Research in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom suggests that parents 
who can work flexibly and have greater senses of control and autonomy in their lives also 
operate more effectively as parents with more positive outcomes for their children. 86 
Conversely they found that children of parents who felt conflict between their work and 
family roles were less contented and developed less well. Paid parental leave, combined with 
work flexibility, can reduce financial stress and help parents achieve a better balance between 
work and family at a formative stage in child development87 thereby enhancing oppo11unities 
for secure attachment. This represents immediate and long-run benefits to society in terms of 
reduced mental health expenditure and long-term benefits in terms of educational attainment, 
sociability and productivity. 
80 TJ Gamble and E Zigler ( 1988) cited in Helen Wilkinson Ti111e Out: The Costs and Benef,ts of Paid Pare/Ila/ 
Lem·e (Demos, London, 1997) 52. 
81 James Ow "Britain on the Couch: Why we are Unhappier Compared with 1950, despite being Richer" cited 
in Helen Wilkinson Ti111e Out: The Costs and Benefits of Paid Parental Lem·e (Demos, London, 1997) 53. 
82 See Gamble and Zigler ( 1986), Crock en burg ( 1981 ), Campbell ( 1979), Nover, Shore, Timberlake and 
Greenspan ( 1984) cited in Harwood, above n 76, 63. 
83 Joe F Pittman and Sally A Lloyd '·Quality of Family Life, Social Support and Stress" ( 1988) 50( I) Journal of 
Marriage and the Family 53. 
84 Harwood, above n 76, 68. 
85 Harwood, above n 76, 67. 
86 Sidle Fuligui and others (1995) cited in Helen Wilkinson Ti111e Out: The Costs and Benefits of Paid Parental 
Lea,·e (Demos, London, 1997) 32. 
87 1 lclen Wilkinson Ti111e Out: The Costs and Bene.fits of"Paid Parental Lea1·e (Demos, London, 1997) 33. 
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2 Breastfeeding 
Breastfeeding 1s widely regarded as providing an infant with developmental and 
psychosocial benefits in addition to the well-documented physiological benefits. 88 However 
this paper will focus on the physiological benefits only. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that infants be fed exclusively on 
breastmilk from bi11h up to the age of 4-6 months. 89 Exclusive breastfeeding has been shown 
to reduce the incidence, severity and duration of common illnesses among newborns, in 
particular, upper respiratory infection, gastrointestinal infection and otitis media (glue ear).90 
There is also evidence that breastfeeding has benefits for mothers including reduction in post-
partum haemorrhage and in the long term, a lower lifetime risk of breast cancer, ovarian 
91 d · 92 cancer an osteoporosis. 
While these health benefits are important in themselves, they are matched by economic 
returns at the national and business levels as well as in the family budget.93 At the national 
level the impact of breastfeeding can be seen in "reduced demand for curative health services 
for mothers and babies and the productivity gains derived from a healthy labour force". 94 In 
New Zealand studies have identified breastfeeding as a factor in lowering the incidence of 
sudden infant death syndrome (SIDs or cot death/5 and glue ear and associated hearing 
failure. The Public Health Commission has noted that glue ear is consistently more common 
among Maori and Pacific Island children who have lower rates of breastfeeding than pakeha 
children.96 
The resulting conductive hearing loss in early childhood can be related to subsequent 
learning impairment, especially in relation to language development and reading skills, and 
88 Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 24. 
89 Breastmilk is a complete and balanced food which contains antibodies and antibiotic properties which 
provide immunological protection against infection . 
90 ILO, above n I, 92. 
91 P Van Esterik and L Menon Being Mother-Friendly: A Practical Guide.for Working IV0111en and Breast.feeding 
( 1996) cited in I LO, above n I, 92. 
92 Blaauw and others ( 1994) cited in Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 25. 
93 ILO, above n I, 92. 
94 ILO, above n I, 92. 
95 Ford and others ( 1993) cited in Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 25. 
96 Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 25. 
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reduced levels of educational attainment.97 There is also evidence to suggest that breastmilk 
enhances the growth and development of the brain and central nervous system.98 
The Royal NZ Plunket Society and the NZ Paediatric Society stress the importance of 
exclusive 'on-demand' breastfeeding until six months of age. 99 Moreover in its policy advice 
to the Ministry of Health, the Public Health Commission advocates the following increases in 
breastfeeding rates by the year 2000: 100 
exclusive breastfeeding at three months from 60 per cent ( 1991) to 75 per cent 
exclusive or partial breastfeeding at six months from 55 per cent ( I 991) to 75 per cent. 
As Callister and Podmore suggest, "[t]hese targets of significantly increased breastfeeding 
rates need to be viewed against a long historical, and potentially conflicting, trend of 
increasing participation in paid work by New Zealand mothers with a child under one year of 
age"_ 101 
The link between parental, or more specifically maternity, leave and support of 
breastfeeding is a key element in the design of most European parental leave policies. 
However the extent to which paid parental leave promotes breastfeeding is unclear. What is 
clear is that many factors affect a mother 's decision to breastfeed. Some studies have found 
"a significantly positive correlation ... between the time for maternal return to work and the 
duration of breastfeeding". 102 In New Zealand, Pacific Island mothers most commonly cited 
"going back to work" as the reason for ceasing breastfeeding between three and nine months 
of age. This is instructive given the importance traditionally placed on breastfeeding in 
Pacific Island communities. 103 Other studies have shown that breastfeeding rates do not 
. . ] · ] · · I 04 mcrease wit 1 more generous maternity eave prov1s1ons. 
Greiner argues that although access to paid parental leave represents the ' major 
determinant ' of whether mothers face material constraints to breastfeeding, paid parental 
•n Public Health Commi ssion ( 1995) cited in Calli ster and Podmore, above n 75, 25. 
98 Bauer and others ( 1991 ), Lucas and others ( 1992) cited in Callister and Podmore, above n 7 5, 25. 
99 Public Health Commission ( 1995) cited in Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 27. 
10° Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 27. 
101 Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 27. 
102 Hansen and others ( 1993) in a study of 360 Danish mothers, cited in Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 28. 
103 Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 36. 
10
~ See Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 28-36. 
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leave alone will not guarantee a corresponding increase in breastfeeding rates. 105 Thus 
Greiner concludes that it is "unrealistic to expect either that employed women will be able to 
maintain exclusive breastfeeding any longer than the maternity leave they receive" or, 
conversely, that women will "necessarily breastfeed optimally, even with optimal maternity 
benefits, unless they are motivated to do so, have the necessary skills, and receive adequate 
support from their families, their employers and the health sector". 106 
However, for low income women, particularly Maori and Pacific Island women in New 
Zealand, it is likely that without payment during parental leave, an early return to work will 
be an economic necessity and that is likely to reduce the duration of breastfeeding. This is 
suppo1ted by literature which indicates that, unlike professional Pakeha women, these women 
are less likely to have employment conditions and facilities which allow or support 
breastfeeding in the workplace. 107 
In conclusion it would appear that paid parental leave may be a material precondition of 
breastfeeding for some, particularly low income, mothers but not a guarantor of exclusive 
breastfeeding for the duration of the leave. Other complementary strategies will need to be 
employed to achieve the Public Health Commission's breastfeeding targets. Both the short 
and long-term benefits of breastfeeding need to be given greater recognition. As Waring 
( 1988) argues, "An inadequately fed infant is a cost to the health system ... , to the education 
system (because of brain development), and to society generally". 108 Thus, to the extent that 
payment during leave allows some mothers, who otherwise would not, to take leave, it 
increases the likelihood and duration of breastfeeding in respect of some infants. 
3 Physic(l/ /,e(l/t/t outcomes in (/(lycllre 
Several studies have indicated that children in out-of-home childcare are more likely to 
contract minor diseases, although these may have few long-term consequences. 109 However 
research in the United States indicates that children attending daycare under the age of three 
years may be up to eight times more likely to contact Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) 
10
' Cited in Callister and Podmore, above n 75 , 31. 
106 Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 31. 
107 See Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 34-36. 
108 Cited in Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 26. 
109 Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 57. 
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than other children, with the risk increasing with the number of hours spent in daycare. In 
turn, children infected by Hib are more likely to contract the serious illnesses of pneumonia 
and meningitis. 11° Conversely, in some circumstances, for example where the parent is a 
heavy smoker, or is violent, being at home with a parent may present a greater health risk for 
a child than daycare. Generally, the evidence suggests that at home care by parents in the 
early months of life has benefits for the physical health of infants as well as for their social 
and emotional health. Thus, to the extent that payment during parental leave will increase the 
proportion of infants cared for at home, who otherwise would be in daycare, there will be 
reduced costs to society in terms of both preventative and curative health care. 
4 RecovelJ' of mother 
A mother needs time to recover from pregnancy and childbirth and to establish 
breastfeeding routines. Both parents, but especially the primary caregiver who is usually the 
mother, need time to adapt to their new, all-consuming role as parent. 
Lack of payment on leave means many mothers return to work too early, take on shift or 
night work and make do with unsatisfactory childcare arrangements. 111 Stress may lead to 
increased expenditure on mental health and specialist health services and poor child 
development outcomes. 
5 Other benefits 
The European Commission ( 1994) also identified the following societal benefits of paid 
11 7 parental leave: -
a) generally, giving children the right to more of their parents' time 
b) giving parents the oppo11unity to spend more time with their children 
c) enhancing choice in the organisation of employment and family life 
d) reducing conflict between work and family life and reducing the ' double burden' 
on women by promoting more equal sharing of family responsibilities 
e) recognising the social impo11ance of motherhood and fatherhood 
f) promoting the well-being of families through contributing to better family 
functioning and relationships. 
110 Public Health Commission ( 1994) cited in Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 57. 
111 The 12 Weeks Paid Parental Leave Campaign h?fcm11atio11 Kit (Wellington, 1994). 
112 Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 60. 
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E Addressing Women's Jnequ{l/ity in the l"bour M"rket 
Women's childbearing role, combined with the practicalities of breastfeeding and 
societal expectations usually result in women assuming the role of primary caregiver and 
bearing the labour market costs of having children. 113 
A longitudinal survey during the period 1968 to 1988 found that, even after controlling 
for actual labour market experience, part-time job status and other explanatory variables, an 
unexplained gap persisted in the wages of mothers compared with non-mothers. 114 The 
Ministry of Women's Affairs, in its briefing to the incoming government in October 1996, 
noted that overseas research has identified three broad areas which contribute to the gender 
pay gap - productivity differences, occupational segregation and discrimination. 11 5 This is 
suppo1ted by occupational segregation and industry studies which have found that women's 
skills are undervalued, that women are concentrated in the lowest paid jobs despite having 
relevant skills and experience and that larger wage differentials occur in firms where 
managers have a high degree of discretion to hire and promote. 116 
I Costs to women 
The labour market costs that women may bear, as a result of rearing children, include: 
I. Where women negotiate for paid parental leave in their employment contracts this 
may be at the expense of other terms and conditions; 11 7 
2. Immediate loss of wages during unpaid leave; 
3. Loss of on-the-job training and career development opportunities; 
113 Ministry of Women's Affairs Additional Adi-ice to the Social Serrices Select Co111111ittee on the Paid Parental 
Lem·e Bill ( I 0.3. 99) 2. 
114 Jane Waldfogel ''The Effect of Children on Women's Wages" ( 1997) 62(2) A111erica11 Sociological Re1·ie1I' 
209,216. 
115 Ministry or Women ' s Affairs Briefing to the lnco111i11g Gol'em111ent 1996 (Wellington, 1996) 66. 
116 Ministry or Women's Affairs Briefing above n 115, 67. 
117 Ministry or Women's Affairs Additional Adrice, above n 113, 3. 
28 
4. Depreciation of skills and experience, and sometimes, loss of confidence about 
participation in paid work; 118 
5. Temporary, casualised employment; 
6. Occupational downgrading; 
7. Lower wages and life-time earnings. In the United States mothers at age 30 earn 
on average 70 per cent of men's pay while non-mothers earn 90 per cent. In 
Britain, mothers at age 33 earn 64 per cent of men's pay while non-mothers earn 
84 per cent; 119 
8. Additional costs of job search, and possible unintended unemployment when 
wishing to re-enter the paid workforce; 
9. Loss of work-related benefits, such as subsidised health care, superannuation, and 
length of service-related benefits; 
I 0. In two-parent families, if it is the mother who leaves paid work , and the father 
who becomes the main breadwinner, traditional roles are reinforced and may be 
difficult to change at a later time. 120 Having these traditional roles reinforced can 
represent a cost for both parents, particularly if the relationship eventually 
dissolves. 12 1 But the long-term costs in terms of lifetime earnings, and provision 
for retirement and old age, are particularly evident for women who have assumed 
I I f · · 12? t 1e ro e o primary caregiver. -
Better educated women are more likely to consider the trade-offs between work and 
family than in the past. And as younger women ' s relative pay continues to increase, the costs 
of having a child in terms of wages forgone will similarly increase. Over a decade the 
opportunity cost of having children is estimated to have increased from between 22 and 27 
per cent of potential family income to between 30 and 37 per cent. 123 
118 Calli ster and Podmore, above n 75, 51 . 
119 Jane Waldfogel "The Family Gap for Young Women in the US and Britain: Can Maternity Leave Make a 
Difference?" ( 1998) 16(3) Jn! of Labor Economics 505 , 532. 
120 Habgood ( 1992b) cited in Cal I ister and Podmore, above n 7 5, 51. 
12 1 Blau and Ferber ( 1986) cited in Calli ster and Podmore, above n 75, 51. 
122 Horsfield ( 1988), Spalter-Roth and Hartmann ( 1990), Ministry of Women' s Affairs ( 1995) cited in Callister 
and Podmore, above n 75 , 51. 
123 S Ringen Citizens, Families and Refrm11 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) cited in Wilkinson , above n 87, 47. 
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Without a cultural shift in attitudes to the care of children and to men's and women's 
joint responsibilities, many women will come to regard parenting as an unattractive prospect -
174 costly, hard work and undervalued. -
2 Rese(lrch on the effects of p(lid p(lrenf(l/ /e(lve 
According to human capital theory, tenure in paid work has considerable impact on 
productivity and earnings. Research undertaken in the United States by Shapiro and Mott 
(1994) confirms this theory, showing that women most attached to the labour market (that is, 
women who were in paid work six months before, and within six months after the birth of a 
child) experienced relatively few changes in their paid work patterns over the subsequent 
14 years. In 1987, 14 to 19 years after their first bi11h, these women received a substantial 
wage premium over women less attached to the labour market. 125 
Longitudinal research in the United States and Britain found that maternity leave had a 
substantial positive wage effect for mothers in both countries. The study found that 126 
Women who have access to leave are, all else being equal, more likely to return to 
their previous employers after childbirth and women who are covered by and use 
maternity leave receive a significant wage premium. In both countries, this maternity 
leave premium was large enough to offset some of the negative wage effects of children. 
The Ministry of Women's Affairs suggests that factors that limit the take-up of leave 
have significant implications. "Women who do not take leave are less likely to return to paid 
employment, more likely to become unemployed or to take a lower paying, lower status job 
when they do return to paid work." 127 
One major factor limiting the take-up of leave is the absence of payment, specifically 
wage replacement, which effectively denies some parents the possibility of exercising their 
right to parental leave. In the New Zealand context this is most likely to be an issue for low 
124 Ringen , above n 123. 
125 Callister and Podmore, above n 75, 51. 
126 Waldfogel "The Family Gap", above n 119, 505. 
127 Ministry of Women ' s Affairs Parental Lem·e Policies, above n 9, 73. 
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income families, particularly Maori and Pacific Island families, and female sole parents under 
18 years who are not eligible for the DPB. Another factor limiting take-up is the perceived 
career costs, especially for professional women. 
Ruhm and Teague's 1995 study of changes in leave legislation in 17 nations over the 
1968- 1988 period found that short to moderate durations of leave are positively related to per 
capita incomes and employment. Conversely lengthier entitlements had negative impacts. 128 
Ruhm estimates that parental leave increases the employment-to-population (EP) ratio 
of all women by 3-4 per cent and of women of childbearing age by approximately 
9 per cent. 129 However in a later study the author considered this result might overstate the 
impact of parental leave because of the difficulty in isolating the effect of paid parental leave 
from other family policies such as subsidised childcare. 130 
Ruhm concluded that women's employment appears to increase with short (less than six 
months) periods of paid leave, whereas their relative wage may fall with more extended 
entitlements. This suggests that leave currently taken in many countries may be so lengthy as 
to reduce women's earnings and labour market position. 13 1 This is supported by the Swedish 
experience where generous paid parental leave is assumed to have increased Swedish 
mothers' labour force pa1ticipation but it "has actually served to depress the time they spend 
in employment when their children are young". 132 Evans and Pupo claim that Swedish 
parental leave policies "contribute to continuing high levels of occupational segregation ... 
and to an employer preference for temporary, rather than permanent employment of 
women". 133 Thus, they conclude that while paid parental leave may relieve some of the 
pressures faced by working mothers, it may not serve the long-term interests of women. 13 -+ In 
a study of Swedish women in four female-dominated workplaces, Karin Widerberg found that 
128 However the authors warn that the direction of causation was not clearly identified, that is, countries might 
extend leave durations when the economy improves, possibly leading to an overestimate of the benefits of 
leave. Cited in Christopher J Ruhm, The Econo111ic Consequences of Parental lem·e Mandates: lessons 
.fi"0111 Europe ( BER Working Paper 5688, Greenboro, 1996) 9. 
129 Ruhm, above n 128, 30. 
130 Ruhm, above n 128. 7. 
131 Ruhm, above n 128, 30. 
132 Patricia Evans and Norene Pupo "Parental Leave: Assessing Women's Interests" ( 1993) 6 CJWL 402, 413. 
133 Evans and Pupo, above n 132, 413. 
134 Evans and Pupo, above n 132, 414. 
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the option to work shot1ened hours was hard for working class women to exercise because it 
does not fit in with the schedule of the workplace. 135 
3 Conclusion 
As a result of the conflicting nature of the objectives of parental leave, parental leave 
policy must tread a fine line in relation to the duration of leave it encourages. While lengthy 
leave may further enhance the health and wellbeing of infants, it may do so at the expense of 
women's long-term labour market position and life-time earnings. Sho11 paid periods of leave 
are associated with gains in this regard. Moreover there is no direct evidence of the 
distortionary or inefficiency costs that economic models tell us will ultimately be passed on to 
women in the form of lower wages and reduced employment. The limited evidence that is 
available suggests that such distortions have not materialised. 
The position of mothers in the labour market represents the negative externalities of 
their childrearing role - the unacknowledged and undervalued costs to mothers of nurturing 
and raising society's future workers. The benefits to society (in terms of reduced mental and 
specialist health and welfare expenditure, increased educational achievement and future 
labour market productivity and so on) of well-nurtured children represent positive 
externalities - also similarly unacknowledged and undervalued. Mothers are not externally 
compensated for the wider benefits that accrue from their caregiving labour. 
In economic terms paid parental leave merely represents a redistribution of income to 
parents, primarily mothers, which compensates them, in part, for the disproportionate costs 
they face; and adequately reflects the wider value of their nw1uring labour in the early months 
of a child's life. Such a redistribution of income would appear to be efficient particularly in 
the long term. Thus, the conflict over paid parental leave is less about economic efficiency 
and more about redistributional and political struggle. However, as can be seen in the public 
debate on the Paid Parental Leave Bill, economic theory and efficiency arguments have been 
used to disguise this struggle. The following section outlines the key economic ideas used to 
frame the debate and oppose the Bill. 
135 Evans and Pupo, above n 132, 415. 
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VI ABUSING NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY 
A The Nation"/ Government: Using Neoc/"ssic"/ Economic Theory to Frame the 
Deb"te 
Laila Harre (the Alliance) moved that the Paid Parental Leave Bill be read a second 
time and gave notice of her intention to have the Bill referred to the Social Services Select 
Committee on 9 September 1998. 136 Prime Minister Jenny Shipley supported the Bill going 
to the select committee. However she ringfenced her support for the Bill and essentially set 
the parameters of the debate and of the officials' advice from there on. 137 
I want to lay out some of the things that I will be looking for in considering 
whether this legislation should advance beyond that point. I make it clear - [interruption] 
- one of the issues that the Government will be looking at is the affordability of such a 
proposal at this time. 
Among others, the Prime Minister laid out two themes which are grounded in 
neoclassical economic theory and which were to become the key opposing arguments in the 
public debate and select committee submissions on the Paid Parental Leave Bill. First, the 
concept of individual choice to bear and rear a child and subsequent individual need for 
women to have leave. Second, the costs to business which would affect the economy and 
ultimately be passed on to low income families and women in particular in the form of 
reduced wages and/or employment. 
These concepts can be seen in the following passages from the Prime Minister ' s speech 
in the House. 138 
Everyone in New Zealand needs to weigh up the question of whether the individual 
needs of women to have parental leave while their children are young are justified against 
the risk that it may exclude some women from an employment opportunity. 
136 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (9 September 1998) 11867. 
137 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, above n 136, 11868. 
138 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, above n 136, 11868. 
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And: 139 
I personally am not convinced that small employers should be required to pay a 
levy to a contributory fund for families, pa11icularly two-income families, that have 
significant gross income, when that may put at risk the workplaces of low-income people. 
As the Labour member for Dunedin North, Pete Hodgson, noted, the Prime Minister 
provided "a series of caveats" to her, and the National Party's, support of the Bill. 140 
B Business/Employer Groups: Using Neoc/assirnl Economic Theory to Oppose the Bill 
Standard neoclassical economic analysis forms the cornerstone of ideological and 
theoretical opposition to the Paid Parental Leave Bill. The primary opponents of the Paid 
Parental Leave Bill are businesses/employers and the organisations that represent them, most 
notably the New Zealand Business Round Table (NZBRT) and the New Zealand Employers 
Federation (NZEF). These organisations unilaterally reject any type of mandated benefits 
ostensibly because it raises the costs of doing business. 
Two of the specific arguments raised by the NZBRT and the NZEF in their submissions 
to the Social Services Select Committee were those emphasised by the Prime Minister on the 
second reading. These were to become the key opposing arguments in public policy debate 
on the Paid Parental Leave Bill. 
(a) Having a baby is a personal lifestyle choice, and as such individuals should bear 
the cost of that choice. 
(b) Paid parental leave will impose costs on business which will distort employment 
arrangements thereby inhibiting economic growth, thus ultimately the cost of paid 
parental leave will be passed on to women by lowering their wages, restricting 
their job opportunities and increasing their unemployment. 
139 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, above n 136, 11869. 
140 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, above n 136, I I 870. 
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1 Jmlividu(I/ choice 
(a) The ideology of individuality 
Having a baby is an individual choice, therefore the cost of paid parental leave 1s a 
matter of individual responsibility. 
Eileen Trzcinski claims that in the United States the ideology of individuality and the 
ideology that a woman's place is in the home are so strong that interest groups, such as the 
US Chamber of Commerce, and private citizens can sometimes block legislation on the 
grounds that children are the individual and exclusive responsibility of their parents. Thus the 
public goods argument for the care of children is rejected by employer groups, particularly if 
they are asked to share part of the societal costs for the investment. 141 As we have seen, the 
public goods argument has also been substantively rejected by the government in New 
Zealand. 
The ideology of individuality has become increasingly popular in all aspects of New 
Zealand life in the last 15-20 years. New Zealand employer organisations, most notably the 
NZBRT and the NZEF, have successfully employed this ideology in the New Zealand paid 
parental leave debate. The NZEF quite unequivocally expressed this view in their submission 
to the select committee considering the Paid Parental Leave Bill. They stated that "[T]he 
decision to have a child is essentially a personal one for which, in the ordinary course of 
events, the parents can expect to take direct responsibility". 142 
The NZBRT was more circumscribe stating: 143 
[This] raises the basic issue of why people who choose not to have children, or are 
unable to do so, those who opt not to take such leave and the self-employed should be 
obliged to pay for the choices made by others. 
141 Trzcinski, above n 62,243. 
142 ew Zealand Employers Federation S11b111issio11 to the Social Serrices Select Co111111illee 011 the Paid 
Parental Leai·e Bill ( 1998) 5. 
143 New Zealand Business Round Table S11b111issio11 to the Social Serrices Select Co111111illee on the Paid 
Parental Leave Bill ( 1998) 3. 
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According to the behavioural postulate of economic theory as women act rationally to 
maximise their utility, the inequality of their labour market position can be explained in terms 
of individual choice. Women gain more utility from raising children than from participating 
in the labour market, consequently they invest less time and money in developing their human 
capital, and they choose lower status jobs, with lower wages and so on. However, this 
theoretical explanation does not account for the reality of women's lives. It denies the 
existence of exogenous constraints on the choices of women and it rejects any wider societal 
responsibility for such constraints. To this end it is an incomplete and inadequate 
explanation. 
(b) \Vhy individual responsibility arguments are wrong: why society should 
contribute to the cost of paid parental leave 
The bearing and rearing of children can not be abstracted and simplified to an individual 
lifestyle choice - it is not that simple. As one working mother lamented in her individual 
submission to the select committee, "In a competitive world it seems now that you've drawn 
the short straw if you get pregnant. It is an illogical and insane lifestyle choice". 14 -1 The 
I 2 Weeks Paid Parental Leave campaign notes that "[a]lthough children are the immediate 
responsibility of their parents, the value of good child-rearing has benefits for society as a 
whole". 1-1 5 Conversely poor child-rearing imposes costs on society as a whole. "The 
importance of the rights and status of children in our society needs to be recognized as a 
wider responsibility than just the immediate family". 146 
The care of children is no longer, if it ever was, a private matter. There is a public 
interest in good parenting which should be reflected in public policy. Policies that are in 
children's interests are also in the interests of society as a whole. 1-1 7 
As outlined in the previous section parental care in the very early formative years (up to 
age three) is generally believed to provide the optimal outcomes for children. Parents, usually 
mothers, who provide an emotionally rich and stimulating environment for infants in their 
early formative years have been found to produce children with positive developmental 
144 Rachel Searby S11b111issio11 to the Social Serrices Select Co111111illee on the Paid Parental lem·e Bill ( 1998) I. 
145 The 12 Weeks Paid Parental Leave Campaign, above n 11 I. 
146 The 12 Weeks Paid Parental Leave Campaign, above n I I I. 
147 Wilkinson, above n 87, 165. 
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outcomes, increased sociability, responsibility, educational achievement, and productivity 
which benefit society as a whole. Societal expectations and business structures are partly, if 
not largely, responsible for the disadvantageous labour market position of mothers. To say 
that the care of children is, or should be, a matter of individual choice and responsibility is 
ludicrous and sho1t-sighted in light of the benefits that accrue to society and the costs that 
society imposes on mothers who rear their children. 
2 Increase,/ costs to business "nd the p"ssing on of those costs 
(a) The ideology of the market 
Economic analyses of paid parental leave and organised opposition to the Paid Parental 
Leave Bill in New Zealand centre on the costs of paid parental leave to business and the 
passing on of those costs to the economy and, in particular, to the people it is meant to help. 
Lawrence Summers explains the economic analysis of paid parental leave as follows: 148 
a type of wage rigidity arises where there is a requirement that firms pay different 
workers the same wage even though the cost of providing benefits differs. For example 
... the expected cost of parental leave is greater for women than for men. If wages could 
freely adjust, these differences in expected benefit costs would be offset by differences in 
wages. If such differences are precluded [for example, by minimum wages], however, 
there will be efficiency consequences as employers seek to hire workers with lower 
benefit costs. It is possible that mandated benefit programs can work against the interests 
of those who most require the benefit being offered. 
This line of thinking can be seen in the NZBRT's submission which stated "the 
provision 149 that the [paid parental leave] levy is not to be charged to employers is delusional. 
In the medium term the cost will primarily come from the wage bill or fall on consumers". 150 
This assumption is explicitly expressed in the NZBRT's submission to the select committee: 
"Companies will take the cost into account when calculating their employment costs for 
future years and the money will come either from reduced wages, reduced wage increases or 
reduced employment" 15 1 and "Income will not be shuffled between employers and employees 
but largely between one employee and another, ll'ithin the same employee's remuneration 
package, or at the expense of the unemployed". 152 
148 Lawrence 1-1 Summers "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Beliefs" ( 1989) 79 (2) American Economic 
Review 177. 
149 Clause 7 of the Paid Parental Leave Bill prohibits offsetting wages by the amount of paid parental leave. 
150 New Zealand Business Round Table, above n 143, 3. 
15 1 New Zealand Business Round Table, above n 143, 3. 
152 New Zealand Business Round Table, above n 143, 4. 
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And the NZEF had this to say: " ... costs ... must be recouped somehow - either as 
increased prices, lower wage and salaries, or reduced employment opportunities". 153 
(b) Why the "costs to business" argument is wrong: why employers should 
contribute to the cost of paid parental leave 
There are a number of responses to the "costs to business" argument. First, as Trzcinski 
states, the question of costs is an empirical one that will be affected by: 
(a) the level of managerial efficiency in covering for the absent parent's work; i s-1 
(b) the increased return to work rates of employees given such leave; 
( c) the increased productivity of these employees as a result of reduced stress, 
particularly financial stress, increased loyalty and improved morale, that is, costs 
which relate to employers' ability to recoup their investment in human capital. 
Based on international economic models, the Ministry of Women's Affairs has 
estimated that the costs to business in the form of an employer levy of 0.21-0.28 per cent of 
total payroll as required by the Bill , may result in a loss of 700-950 jobs across the labour 
market, with 600-800 of those jobs being concentrated among women. 155 However in the 
main body of the repo1t it was also stated that given over 90 per cent of employers would, on 
average, be expected to face annual costs of less than $750 in levies, this cost alone would be 
unlikely to have a significant impact on decisions to employ more staff (or reduce staff) for 
many of those firms". It is important to keep in mind that these figures are estimates based on 
economic modelling. They are not the result of empirical research. Many variables remain 
unaccounted for in this, as in any, abstract modelling exercise. 
Does international research show that the business costs are passed on in this way and to 
the extent claimed? The evidence suggests not, wages and employment effects appear to be 
positive where there is a short period (less than six months) of paid leave. Negative impacts 
153 New Zealand Employment Federation, above n 142, 2. 
154 Trzcinski , above n 62, 243. 
155 Ministry of Women's Affairs Additional Ad,·ice, above n 113, 4. 
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can be seen where leave durations are lengthy. However the methodology of the available 
research is somewhat problematic, clear causal relationships cannot be accurately identified. 
Neve1theless, at the very least we can say that claims of negative wage and employment 
effects and of inhibited economic growth are greatly exaggerated. The available, albeit 
llawed, evidence points to slightly positive or neutral effects on wages, employment and 
economic growth. 
Trzcinski argues that even from a neoclassical economics viewpoint, parental leave 
could be viewed as a technological innovation. As such it will be found that "some firms 
adopt cost-saving innovations quickly, other firms learn more slowly and can continue to 
operate in the short term using less efficient and outmoded managerial and technological 
· ,, I S6 practices . -
Second, this argument is based on an ideological assumption not only that mandated 
leave inevitably lowers profits but that it is wrong to ask or expect businesses to shoulder 
some of the costs associated with meeting the needs of families. 157 Trzcinski and Finn-
Stevenson argue that there is a case for government intervention to mandate paid parental 
leave in order to challenge and compel businesses to face up to their social responsibilities. 
"Mandated paid parental leave may be necessary to ensure that some firm are unable to 
prosper from their disregard for the needs of children and their families." 158 
It is at least arguable that employers, because they choose to rely on and profit from 
human production, must acknowledge and bear some responsibility for the natural and 
inevitable fact that humans procreate. Thus as an absence from work is required when a child 
is born , employers should make some contribution. 
Third, when employer organisations claim that paid parental leave will interfere with 
economic growth and productivity, they "deny any link between today's children and 
156 Trzcinski , above n 6:?., :?.43. 
157 Eileen Trzcinski and Matia Finn-Stevenson "A Response to Arguments against Mandated Parental Leave: 
Findings from the Connecticut Survey of Parental Leave Policies" ( 1991) 53 Journal of Marriage and the 
Family 445, 448. 
158 Trzcinski and Finn-Stevenson "A Response to Arguments", above n 157,447. 
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tomorrow's society". 159 If employers benefit from well-nurtured children in the long term, 
then employers should bear some responsibility for sharing at least part of the cost - an 
investment in future productivity. Otherwise employers can be seen as free-riders. Individual 
parents bear the costs while future businesses share the benefits of well-adjusted productive 
employees. 160 
Fourth, as employers are at least pa1tly responsible for the negative externalities faced 
by women in the form of labour market barriers, because they discriminate against women, 
then they should be responsible for contributing to the costs of measures which can reduce 
those barriers. This could be regarded as analogous to a discrimination tax and may be highly 
efficient. If employers contribute to reducing barriers, if barriers are reduced and women's 
labour market position improves, the contribution required from employers would fall. Thus 
it may act as an incentive for employers to reduce discrimination and it may encourage 
additional innovative measures which assist women to combine their caregiving and paid 
work roles. 
Similarly, Helen Wilkinson argues that the fact that work difficulties impact on families 
at a rate three times higher than family problems on work, bringing with it stress and ill-
health 161 whose costs are borne by individuals and taxpayers, also strengthens the argument 
for some degree of employer responsibility. 162 
Fifth, there is considerable research indicating that the costs of introducing paid parental 
leave, and other family-friendly policies, are often outweighed by the long-term benefits to 
employers in terms of higher staff morale and increased productivity. These benefits may 
include: 
I. Reduced staff turnover which reduces the employer's cost of recruiting and 
training new employees ( estimated at between 25 and 125 per cent of a year's 
159 Trzcinski and Finn-Stevenson "A Response to Arguments", above n 157, 448. 
160 Trzcinski and Finn-Stevenson "A Response to Arguments", above n 157, 448. 
161 Children's Trust Foundation (Seattle, 1995) cited in Wilkinson, above n 87, 97. 
162 Wilkinson , above n 87, 97. 
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salary)
163 
and retains the firm-specific human capital (training, development and 
experience) invested in women employees; 
2. Reduced employee stress, improved employee health as a result of returning to 
work at an appropriate time and having a better balance of work and family 
commitments. A British research study has found that employees who are less 
worried about what is going on at home are free to be more creative at work. 164 
3. Improved employee motivation and loyalty. A US study found that workers show 
more initiative and were more supportive of their employer as a direct 
consequence of what they saw as a recognition of their family responsibilities. 165 
In addition workers are more likely to demonstrate reverse flexibility including 
increased willingness to do unpaid overtime. 166 
4. Better time-management skills. Some American companies that have instituted 
paid parental leave and family friendly policies have discovered that women 
returning from paid parental leave are more productive than before childbirth. 
Productivity in this context was measured in relation to achievements and tasks 
accomplished rather than the traditional measures of hours worked and rates of 
absenteeism. This would be a fruitful area for future research. 
Leaving aside the issue of payment, the European Commission ( 1994) claims that, in 
general, there is little evidence from European research to indicate that parental leave, or any 
other predictable leave causes problems or costs to employers. This is, at least partly, due to 
the fact that parental leave affects only a small segment of the workforce at any one time. 167 
To conclude, in considering the actual costs of mandated paid parental leave, we must 
consider the full consequences of the status quo - on children, families and society as a 
whole. The debate has been narrowed to consideration of the costs faced by one group in 
society - business, and it has been narrowed to the sho11-term costs. What of the long-term 
1<'3 12 Weeks Paid Parental Leave Campaign, above n 111 . 
164 Cited in Wilkinson, above n 87, 149. 
165 Wilkinson, above n 87, 146. 
166 Wilkinson, above n 87, 148. 
167 Callister and Podmore, above n 75 , 59. 
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costs and benefits? What of our future wellbeing and that of today's children and their 
children? 
If we accept that employers and society as a whole should contribute towards the costs 
of raising children, then we need to move the debate on to considering how this might best be 
achieved. 
Neither government nor business has adapted to the new reality of family life - that 
women's labour force participation has greatly increased and will continue to do so and that 
most families rely on two incomes to maintain a suitable standard of living. Government 
provides little economic support for parenting and employers take little account of the family 
lives of their employees. Working time is organised in ways that ignore the needs of modern 
families. Paid Parental Leave represents the first , critical step towards achieving a sustainable 
balance between the needs of the family and the needs of the economy 168 - a first critical step 
that New Zealand has not yet made. Why should this be so? 
The National Government and business/employer groups used neoclassical economic 
theory to oppose the Paid Parental Leave Bill and present it as economically inefficient and 
too costly to implement. However as outlined in Section V of this paper, neoclassical 
economic theory, specifically the concepts of public goods and externalities, can and does 
suppo11 a case for the legislative provision of paid parental leave. The two key arguments 
used to oppose the Bill do not withstand closer scrutiny. In particular the arguments 
regarding the detrimental effects of imposing the cost of paid parental leave on business are 
theoretically made out but not empirically substantiated. Thus, the conflict over the Bill 
appears to be less concerned with economic efficiency than with political and redistributional 
struggle. More specifically I would suggest that economic theory, ostensibly used in the 
public interest by both the National Government and business/employer groups, was actually 
used to disguise the pursuit of self-interest in both cases. The short-term economic interests 
of business/employers would be served by preventing the imposition of an additional cost on 
production as advocated in the Paid Parental Leave Bill. The way in which the National 
Government's interests would be served by the failure of the Bill is the subject of the next 
section. 
168 Wilkinson , above n 87, 166. 
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VII PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
A Brief Overview of Public Choice Theo,y 
"Public choice [i s] the economic study of non-market decision making, or simply the 
application of economics to political science." 169 According to Dennis Mueller, the 
contribution of public choice theory derives from the insights deduced from abstract models 
which are based on a few simplified assumptions. Mueller describes the subject matter of 
public choice theory as 170 
the same as that of political science, the theory of the state, voting rules, voter 
behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of public choice is 
that of economics, however. The basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for 
economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational utility maximizer. 
In public law the fundamental issue we face is whether Parliament can claim legitimacy 
111 the formulation of its public policy. Some of the public choice literature suggests that 
legislatures cannot and do not speak for the general public, but for well-organised interest 
groups, or that legislatures are incapable of making good public policy because they cannot 
exercise their deliberative role. 171 
Public choice models often treat the legislative process as a microeconomic system in 
which "actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups to 
fu11her their own interests". 172 
B The Economic Theory of Legislation 
David Mayhew argues that the actions of legislators can be explained by "the simple 
abstract assumption that representatives are single-minded seekers of re-election".
173 The 
169 Dennis Mueller "Public Choice I" ( 1979) ci ted in Daniel A Farber and Philip P Frickey "The Juri sprudence 
of Public Choice" ( 1987) 65 (5) Texas LR 873, 878. 
170 Mueller, above n 169. 
17 1 Daniel A Farber and Philip P Frickey "The Juri sprudence of Public Choice" ( 1987) 65 (5) Texas L Rev 873, 
874. 
172 Gary Becker "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence ( 1983) 98 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 371. 
173 D Mayhew "Congress: The Electoral Connection" ( 1974) cited in Daniel A Farber and Philip P Frickey "The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice" ( 1987) 65 Texas LR 873, in Maxwell L Steam's Public Choice and Public 
Lc/11': Readings and Co111111entarr (Anderson Publishing Co, Cincinnati, 1997) 5, 9. 
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assumption that legislators 
174 are motivated solely by self-interest, particularly that they must 
maximise their prospects of re-election, lies at the core of the economic theory of legislation. 
Economic models of legislative behaviour can be categorised into two groups. 
Constituent interest 
This economic model assumes that MPs maximise their appeal to voters who vote, in 
turn, according to their own economic self-interest. Thus, MPs' votes should be predictable 
according to their constituents' economic interests. 175 1 would fw1her suggest that votes 
should be predictable according to constituents' short-term economic interests. 
2 Interest group influence 
The second model emphasises the role of interest groups in obtaining or blocking 
legislation which furthers their economic interests , in exchange for campaign contributions, 
votes and implicit promises of future favours. "In short, legislation is 'sold' by the legislature 
and 'bought' by the beneficiaries of the legislation." 176 
The models assume that "self-interest is the exclusive causal agent in politics"
177 and 
rejects the role of ideology 178 as a significant influence on the motivations of voters and of 
MPs. 
The foundational assumption of economic theory - that individuals act rationally to 
max11rnse their self-interest - has been widely criticised in political science and legal 
scholarship 179 for its naivety and its failure to perform empirically. The disciplines of 
psychology and sociology, and everything we instinctively know, tell us that individuals -
that people - are not motivated solely by self-interest but by a range of often conflicting 
emotions, wants and needs which vary in intensity with time and circumstance. Furthermore, 
we know that people do not always act rationally; rather they often react emotionally. Thus, 
174 Hereafter referred to as MPs. 
175 Farber and Friekey, above n 171. 
176 Landes and Posner "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective" ( 1975) 18 Jnl or Law and 
Econ 875 , 877 cited in Farber and Frickey, above n 171 , 9. 
177 Farber and Frickey, above n 171 , 16. 
178 Defined as the individual ' s beliefs about what serves the public interest. 
179 See p Green and I Shapiro "The Pathology of Rational Choice Theory' ' cited in Farber and Frickey, above 
n 171 , and Edward L Rubin "Public Choice in Practice and Theory" ( 1993) 81 Cal L Rev 1657. 
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the foundational assumption of economic theory and therefore of public choice theory also, is 
inadequate and incomplete. Nevertheless, a theory that makes simplified, even unrealistic 
assumptions may yet have some predictive or explanatory power 180 and that is an empirical, 
rather than a theoretical question. 
Farber and Frickey claim that the economic theory of legislation does not withstand 
. . I . 1 s 1 empmca scrutmy. Farber and Frickey propose a mixed model , a weak version of the 
economic theory, which accords with the political science literature. In the mixed model the 
economic interests of voters, interest groups and ideology all influence legislative conduct to 
varying degrees depending on the nature of the legislation. 
The question to consider is whether the economic theory of legislation adequately 
accounts for the failure of the Paid Parental Leave Bill , as predicted by public choice theory , 
or whether ideology, or other factors played a part, as has been empirically demonstrated in 
other contexts. 182 
The economic theory of legislation can be briefly summarised as follows: MPs, as 
single-minded seekers of re-election , will act to maximise their appeal to constituents' 
economic interests in order to obtain their votes. In addition, interest groups seeking to 
max1m1se their own economic interests will have a disproportionately strong influence on 
legislative outcomes depending on the extent to which they can further MPs' interests, 
particularly MPs' re-election prospects. 
C Interest Group Influence 
In 1986 Kay Schlozman and John Tierney published a systematic study of interest 
group politics. They concluded that "representation through interest group politics is skewed 
dramatically to upper class and upper middle class interests".
183 
The study also found that 
18° Farber and Frickey, above n 171, 19. 
181 See Farber and Frickey's discussion of this point, above n 171 , 18-19. 
182 See Farber and Frickey, above n 171 , 18-19. 
183 Farber and Frickcy, above n 171, 873, 878. 
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today many interest groups are well-resourced and engage in sophisticated political strategies, 
including active involvement in electoral politics. 184 
Schlozman and Tierney suggest that interest group influence is likely to be strongest in 
the following circumstances: 185 
I . "When the interest group 1s attempting to block rather than obtain 
legislation." 
2. "When the group's goals are narrow and involve low visibility issues." 
3. "When the group has substantial support from other groups and pub! ic 
officials (who are themselves important figures and not merely referees of 
the group struggle)" and 
4. "When the group is able to move the issue to a favorable forum, eg. a 
Sympathetic Congressional Committee". 
In the context of the New Zealand paid parental leave debate, the interest groups 
opposing the Bill, most notably the NZEF and the NZBRT, fit the Schlozman and Tierney 
profile - they are well resourced, and they are actively engaged in politics at many levels. 
They make frequent submissions to select committees on social and economic policies. 186 
The question to consider is whether the circumstances surrounding the Paid Parental 
Leave Bill were of the kind Schlozman and Tierney identify as indicative of strong interest 
group influence. The answer has to be a resounding 'yes'. 
First, the NZBRT and the NZEF were attempting to block the Paid Parental Leave Bill. 
Second, the groups' goals were narrow - to prevent employer funding of paid parental 
leave. However this is not a low-visibility issue. Paid parental leave and its funding are of 
widespread and popular concern to New Zealanders. There has been considerable public 
debate about the issues. 
184 Farber and Frickey, above n 171, 878. 
185 Farber and Frickcy, above 11 171 , 886. 
186 Farber and Frickey, above 11 171, 14. 
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Third, the NZBRT and the NZEF do have substantial support from other groups, 
particularly small businesses, and specifically from public officials and legislators who are 
supporters of neoclassical economic theory and well-versed in its arguments and applications 
to social policy, pa11icularly the Treasury who developed the Parental Tax Credit policy to 
replace the Paid Parental Leave Bill, and the Department of Labour who costed the Paid 
Parental Leave Bill but made no attempt to cost the status quo or the long-term benefits of 
paid parental leave. 
Fourth, the Paid Parental Leave Bill was considered in, and the NZBRT and the NZEF 
presented submissions to, a favourable forum - the Social Services Select Committee, a 
committee with a majority of government MPs and members well-acquainted with the key 
tenets of neoclassical economic theory as employed by successive New Zealand governments 
since 1984 in a bid to reduce public debt and increase economic efficiency. 
The circumstances surrounding the Paid Parental Leave Bill are of the kind Schlozman 
and Tierney identify as indicative of strong interest group influence. In addition the 
business/employer vote is a substantial one with influence far beyond the individual votes 
concerned. Small businesses have regular contact with members of the public and potential 
for disseminating information and ideas. The NZBRT is an extremely well-resourced, 
influential group which makes substantial investments in the public promulgation of its free 
market ideas; ideas which are claimed to be in the public interest and yet it is the NZBRT, as 
the owners of business, who stand to gain most profitably from such ideas. But whether the 
influence of the NZBRT and the NZEF provides a sufficient explanation for the demise of the 
Paid Parental Leave Bill is not entirely clear. Their influence needs to be considered in light 
of the wider political circumstances. 
The next section will consider the extent to which the National Government's conduct 
m relation to the Paid Parental Leave Bill can be seen as maximising their chances of 
re-election as opposed to reflecting their ideological position or their desire to make good 
public policy. 
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D Tlte Natiomtl Government: Maximising their Re-election Prospects or Making Good 
Policy? 
I The referral of tlte Bill to the select committee 
Given the extent of popular suppo11 for paid parental leave, 18? it would have been 
politically unwise for the government to stop the Bill going to the select committee at that 
time. The government was unsteady around the time of the Coalition break-up and there was 
uncertainty as to whether it would have sufficient numbers to defeat the Bill so it voted its 
support. The Prime Minister's framing of the debate in terms of individual choice, of 
affordability, pa11icularly costs to business and its resultant effects would maximise her and 
the National Pa11y's appeal to voters' short-term economic interests and go some way towards 
placating the protests of business. 
2 Ofjicfrtl advice 
If making good public policy could be regarded as a motivating force on the pa11 of the 
National Government, one would expect that the advice to the select committee from key 
depa11mental officials, principally from the Department of Labour and the Ministry of 
Women's Affairs, would present the short and long-term costs and benefits of paid parental 
leave in order to help the government decide whether, on balance, the introduction of paid 
parental leave in the form proposed would be in the overall public interest - whether it would 
be good public policy. 
Relatively little support was given to paid parental leave in the advice from officials. 
This was predictable given the way the debate was framed by the Prime Minister during the 
second reading. There is a proliferation of literature from many academic disciplines which 
suppo11s paid parental leave, citing many benefits to children, women, families, employers 
and society generally. The advice from officials is largely limited to an assessment of the 
short and medium-term costs and risks involved in implementing the Paid Parental Leave Bill. 
While that might be expected in the ordinary course of a government bill, it appears 
187 A National Business Review opinion poll showed 60% support for the Paid Parental Leave Bill, 53% of 
respondents favoured 12 weeks, 40% preferred employer funding and 36% preferred funding via taxation , 
47% favoured an income-related payment. "Public Demands Others to Fund Paid Parental Leave" National 
Business Revie,r, 23 April 1999, 16. 
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incongruous in the context of an opposition bill on which the government has declared itself 
undecided. 
The briefing papers from departmental officials do not attempt to estimate the economic 
value of the many, often long-term, benefits of paid parental leave, nor do they attempt to 
estimate the costs of the status quo, costs borne predominantly by women and children. 
Section V of this paper shows how neoclassical economic theory can suppo1i a case for 
paid parental leave and there have been attempts elsewhere, to quantify the costs and benefits 
to society of having and not having parental leave. This is particularly so in the context of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act 1993 in the United States. Considerable research was carried 
out on the costs of not having parental leave, costs borne predominantly by women in terms 
of immediate and long-term wage losses, reduced labour market position, physical and 
psychological health, and children in terms of physical health, social, emotional, and 
cognitive development. This research demonstrates that the costs of not having parental leave 
far outweigh the costs of providing it. 188 If ideology was an important motivator and if the 
government was genuinely concerned about economic efficiency and making good public 
policy, one would expect that their officials would have been given a wider brief. The fact 
that they were, and often are, not raises the issue of whether Parliament is capable of 
exercising its deliberative role. Select committees were designed for this purpose, as well as 
to increase participation in the democratic process. 
3 The introduction of the Parental Tax Credit 
The Parental Tax Credit policy was quite clearly introduced by the National 
Government in the 1999 Budget in order to scuttle the Paid Parental Leave Bill and replace it 
with a cheaper government measure. It was not a principled decision and it was a decision 
antithetical to making good public policy. It was not a decision recognising the merit of any 
public good, or other arguments to redistribute income to families, particularly mothers, with 
young children. Otherwise it would have been designed so as to make some progress towards 
188 Sec R Marra and Lindner "The True Cost of Parental leave: The Parental Leave Cost Model" in D Friedman 
and others Parenta/ leare and Productil·ity (Families and Work Institute, New York, 1992) and RM Spalter-
Roth and HI I lartmann "Unnecessary Losses: Costs to Americans of the Lack of Family and Medical Leave·· 
(Institute for Women's Policy Research, Washington DC, 1990) cited in E Trzcinski "The Use and Abuse of 
Neoclassical Theory in the Political Arena" in Edith Kuiper and Jolande Sap 0111 of the Mmgin: Fe111i11is1 
Perspecti,·es on Eco110111ics (Routledge, London, 1995) 231-246. 
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the objectives of parental leave - to improve the health and welfare of children and mothers 
and to address women's labour market inequality. It is important that in this context we do 
not mistake this policy as efficient. The Parental Tax Credit is cheap, not efficient. It cuts 
costs; it does not adequately reflect the value of caring for children. It was a decision in the 
short-term interests of the National Government. It was a decision aimed at maximising their 
chances of re-election. The government could not be seen to support or allow the passage of a 
non-government Bill, whatever its merits. However such is the widespread popular support 
for paid parental leave that quashing the bill in an election year may have had serious 
electoral repercussions for the government. They needed to give families something, but not 
much, in order to maximise the public vote and the business vote. 
4 Tlte select committee report 
Making good public policy was clearly not on the agenda, or even near the agenda. In 
the select committee report the majority (National) gave no ideological or other opposition to 
the Bill itself; they simply presented the Parental Tax Credit Policy. As the Alliance member 
b d . l l . 189 o serve 111 t 1e se ect committee repo11, 
it is notewo11hy that no individual who makes up [the] majority has proposed any 
amendment to the Bill or recorded their conclusions as to either: 
• why the objectives of the Bill are not met by it; or 
• why those objectives are not worthy; or 
• while worthy, those objectives are not objectives which their pa11ies consider 
worth pursuing at this time. 
This quite clearly suggests that the government was more interested 111 pursu111g a 
tactical strategy than in the ideological merits or otherwise of the Bill. 
In recommending that the Paid Parental Leave Bill not proceed, the majority of the 
Social Services Select Committee stated their belief that "the Parental Tax Credit policy is a 
fair and equitable way of providing assistance to families with newborn children who are 
. d" 190 I d. most 111 nee . 1sagree. 
189 Social Services Select Committee, above n 35, I. 
190 Social Services Select Committee, above n 35, 16. 
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If we take the two fundamental objectives of parental leave, the Parental Tax Credit 
fails to satisfy even the less controversial objective - improving mother and infant health and 
welfare and it does not even acknowledge the more controversial objective - to address 
women ' s unequal position in the labour market and the ongoing discrimination of women 
resulting from their childbearing role. In fact the Parental Tax Credit may serve to heighten 
the problems already faced by women. The Parental Tax Credit policy targets family income 
which is inherently discriminatory as it treats women as part of a household rather than as 
individual workers. The family that will gain most from this policy is the traditional 
patriarchal family with a male breadwinner (earning less than $37,000 per annum) and a 
female caregiver who remains at home. There will be no income loss when a baby is born so 
the tax credit equates to a $1200 income top-up for those families. Families reliant solely on 
a mother ' s income - the families shown to be the poorest of all families - will not be assisted 
by the tax credit. Mothers of such families will be entitled to a welfare benefit but not to the 
tax credit as well.
19 1 The family tax credit will provide refundable credits for low income 
taxpayers which will help such taxpayers. However the reality is that tax credits are of little 
use to people who are barely making ends meet on a day to day basis. It will not enable them 
to take the parental leave to which they are entitled under the Parental Leave and Employment 
Protection Act 1987, it will provide a lump sum after the fact and too late. The Parental Tax 
Credit is better than nothing, but not much. 
If ideology does play a part in the National Government ' s treatment of the Paid Parental 
Leave Bill , I would suggest that the ideology concerned is a typically conservative belief in 
the importance of the traditional role of women as stay-at-home mothers. This belief is likely 
to be patticularly prevalent among the older members of the National Patty. It is a belief at 
odds with the reality of family living as we approach the millennium. Without paid parental 
leave, many women cannot afford to be stay-at-home mothers for 12 weeks, let alone any 
longer. 
The Parental Tax Credit reflects the ideology of individual or private choice because it 
provides financial assistance for whatever arrangements parents prefer for their children. If 
one accepts any arguments for public responsibility for children, if one acknowledges any 
public good element in the care of children, tailoring the policy choice response to the 
19 1 Alliance member Social Serrices Select Co111111ittee Report on the Paid Parental l em ·e Bill (25.6.99) 3. 
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ideology of private market and private or individual choice becomes incoherent. As Lucinda 
Finley observes, "[T]he tax relief route essentially reinforces the status quo, and therein may 
lie its strongest appeal to conservatives." 192 
The introduction of the Parental Tax Credit in the circumstances was a supremely clever 
short-term political move. Whether it will be so clever for National in the long term remains 
to be seen. Sadly the introduction of the Parental Tax Credit may only serve to further delay 
the time when working families with young children, particularly mothers, will receive 
effective compensation for some of the costs they face and some of the benefits they provide 
in raising our future labour force and our future society. 
To summarise, the importance of ideology or making good public policy as a motive for 
government action has been demonstrated in other contexts, however ideology does not 
appear to have played a large part in the political progress of the Paid Parental Leave Bill, 
despite appearances to the contrary. The economic theory of legislation appears to offer a 
more substantial account of the failure of the Paid Parental Leave Bill to progress beyond the 
select committee stage. The circumstances surrounding the Paid Parental Leave Bill indicate 
strong interest group influence. The business/employer vote is a substantial one, which the 
government would be loathe to lose, and the NZBRT and the NZEF mounted a powerful, 
extensive and very public opposition campaign. In addition, it appears that officials were 
given a narrow brief with respect to the Bill given that it was a non-government Bill on which 
the government had declared itself undecided. This suggests that the government never had 
any intention of suppo1ting the Bill beyond the select committee stage. Moreover the 
government's introduction of the Parental Tax Credit Policy under budget urgency during 
select committee deliberations on the Bill can only be regarded as a cynical self-serving 
strategy aimed at maximising the government's prospects of re-election, especially given that 
the majority opinion in the select committee repo1t did not raise any ideological or other 
opposition to the Bill itself. 
192 Lucinda M Finley "Legal Aspects of Child Care: The Policy Debate over the Appropriate Amount of Public 
Responsibility" in Janet Shibley Hyde and Marilyn J Essex (eds) Parental Lem·e and Childcare: Selling a 
Research Policy Agenda (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1991) 125, 154. 
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How were the government's chances of re-election maximised? First, and most 
importantly, the government had not alienated the business/employer vote by supporting a 
Bill they strongly opposed. Second, the Parental Tax Credit gives something, albeit not 
much, to the public who have voiced strong support for paid parental leave, thus the 
government minimised the alienation of the public vote. Third, the government avoided 
lending potentially vote-winning credibility to the Alliance, through suppo11 of the Bill close 
to an election. 
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VJJJ CONCLUSION 
Family life has changed. The traditional family with a stay-at-home mother and a 
breadwinning father is becoming increasingly rare as more and more women participate in 
paid work, particularly when their children are young. It would appear that, unlike most 
countries in the world which provide paid parental leave, government and business in New 
Zealand have not adapted to the reality of working family life as we approach the millennium. 
Paid parental leave represents the first, critical step
193 towards achieving a sustainable balance 
between the needs of the family and the needs of the economy. Laila Harre put paid parental 
leave on New Zealand's political agenda with the introduction of the Paid Parental Leave Bill. 
The National Government and business groups, the NZBRT and the NZEF, have used 
arguments grounded in neoclassical economic theory to oppose the Bill and portray it as 
economically inefficient and too costly to implement. However, empirical evidence fails to 
support their claims. Moreover, neoclassical economic theory can, and does, support a case 
for paid parental leave, as shown in Section V, particularly if a long-term view is taken. 
Thus, 1 have argued that the National Government and business groups "abused" 
neoclassical economic theory by using it, ostensibly in the public interest, to disguise the 
pursuit of their own self-interested ends. To this end, public choice theory offers a substantial 
explanation for the failure of the Paid Parental Leave Bill to progress beyond the select 
committee stage. Much of the political progress of the Bill can be explained in terms of 
strong interest group influence from the NZBRT and NZEF, and in terms of the National 
Government acting rationally to maximise its prospects of re-election. The role of ideology
194 
in determining the fate of the Bill is barely discernible. 
193 It is iniportant to ackno\vledge that paid parental leave cannot achieve its objectives alone. In order to further 
improve the health and welfare of children and mothers and address women's inequality in the labour market, 
it must be part of a comprehensive ' family ' approach to social and economic policy. Paid parental leave 
must be supported by other measures. The way we work and the structures within which we work need to be 
reconsidered. 1 ligh quality affordable childcare must be easily accessible. There must be a shift in cultural 
attitudes towards the role of fathers as caregivers. There must be an increase in the value we as a society 
place on caring work in all its forms. 
194 Demonstrated as an important motivator for legislators generally. 
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What does this mean for the legitimacy of public policy making in New Zealand? 
Quite possibly nothing. The demise of the Paid Parental Leave Bill in New Zealand was 
inevitable given its political circumstances. We did not need public choice theory to tell us 
that. It was a non-government Bill introduced to the House by chance not long before an 
election. Thus, public choice theory appears to have lived up to one of the major criticisms of 
it, that its explanations are often tautological. There is not a whole lot to learn from here. 
Public choice theory looks good, it looks objective and it looks complicated. It is 
complicated. But it is not good nor is it objective. In the final analysis the very 
simplifications (primarily the behavioural assumption that all individuals act rationally to 
maximise their self-interest) that give public choice theory its theoretical structure, predictive 
and explanatory powers rob it of meaning. 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS RELEVANT TO PARENTAL LEAVE 
A The lnternatiomt! Covenant on Economic, Social, am/ Cultural Rights 
Article I 0(2) provides 
Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before 
and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave 
or leave with adequate social security benefits. 
At the time of ratification in 1978, New Zealand made the following reservation which 
is still in effect: 
The Government of New Zealand reserves the right to postpone, in the economic 
circumstances foreseeable at the present time, the implementation of A11icle ( I 0) 2 as it 
relates to paid maternity leave or leave with[out] adequate social security benefits. 
B United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDA W) 
This covenant was ratified by ew Zealand in 1984. Article I 1 (2) provides: 
in order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or 
maternity and to ensure their effective rights to work, States Parties shall take appropriate 
measures ... 
(b) to introduce maternity leave with pay or comparable social benefits without 
loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances. 
New Zealand also entered a reservation in relation to A11icle I I (2) of CEDA W that is 
still in force . 
C I LO Convention No 103 
New Zealand has not ratified Convention No I 03. Only 53 of the ILO member states 
have ratified either Convention No I 03 or its predecessor, a 1919 convention concerning the 
employment of women before and after childbi11h. 
This convention provides for the availability of a minimum entitlement of 12 weeks ' 
maternity leave. There is a requirement for a mandatory leave period of six weeks after 
confinement, and for payment of cash and medical benefits in accordance with national laws, 
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and under conditions prescribed by countries. The convention also provides for nursmg 
breaks in accordance with national legislation or regulation, and that it should be unlawful for 
a person's employment to be terminated for reasons associated with maternity leave. Most of 
the countries that provide paid parental leave under this convention do so through the use of 
contributory social insurance schemes. 195 
D /LO Convention No 156 
This convention requires member states to declare and pursue national policy designed 
to promote equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation by 
methods appropriate to national conditions and practice. This convention has not been 
ratified by New Zealand. 
E /LO P{lrt-time Work Convention 1994 No 175 
This convention requires that patt-time workers enjoy the same conditions as full-time 
workers in a comparable situation. This convention has not been ratified by New Zealand. 
The New Zealand requirement that an employee must have been employed for more than 
I O hours per week over a period of one year contravenes this convention. 
F Univers{I/ Dec/{lmfion ofH11m,111 Rights (UDHK) 
Article 26(2) provides: "motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance. All children whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection". 
195 Revision of Convention I 03. As a part of the process of revising Convention I 03, the ILO has prepared a 
questionnaire seeking the views of member countries' governments as to what the content of a revised 
convention should be. The tenor of the questionnaire is towards the universal provision of payments, 
whether this is by the employer, the employee, or the government. The questionnaire suggests that any 
convention would allow member countries to choose their own eligibility criteria for coverage, with 
ineligible women being presumed to be eligible for benefits from the state. A government response to the 
questionnaire is currently being prepared. 
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G Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Article 3( I) provides: "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public 
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration". In addition Article 26 
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits discrimination 
on the grounds of sex. 
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